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SEC ACTIONS AGAINST LAWYERS IN THE AGE OF SARBANES-OXLEY
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and Michael J. Sullivan*
I. INTRODUCTION
Following the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on July
30, 2002,1 the SEC has substantially increased the number of 
actions it has initiated against lawyers. In a speech at UCLA Law 
School on September 20, 2004, Stephen M. Cutler, the then 
Director of the SEC’s Division of Enforcement, stated: 
Consistent with Sarbanes-Oxley’s focus on the important 
role of lawyers as gatekeepers, we have stepped up our 
scrutiny of the role of lawyers in the corporate frauds 
we investigate. We have named lawyers as respondents or 
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2defendants in more than 30 of our enforcement actions 
in the past two years.2
Since the date of Mr. Cutler’s speech, the intensity of the
SEC’s actions against lawyers has continued unabated. One legal 
note stated that according to the SEC staff there were 76 actions 
initiated against lawyers in the 3½ years leading up to April 7, 
2005, including 18 in the first 3 months of 2005 alone. The same 
note emphasized forcefully:
A substantial number of SEC enforcement actions in 
recent years against counsel to public companies (both
internal and external) have highlighted the SEC’s 
resolve to hold lawyers liable for not performing 
adequately their SEC–conceived role as “gatekeepers” to 
prevent fraud and other securities law violations.3
The SEC’s actions have embraced a wide variety of 
alleged transgressions in a wide diversity of factual 
settings. These SEC actions have been prosecuted as civil 
injunctive actions in the federal district courts under 
§20(b) of the Securities Act of 1933 and §21(d) of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as administrative 
proceedings under Rule 102(e) of the SEC’s Rules of 
2 Speech by Stephen M. Cutler, The Themes of Sarbanes-Oxley as Reflected 
in the Commission’s Enforcement Program, UCLA School of Law, Los 
Angeles, CA, (Sep. 20, 2004) 
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3Practice, and as administrative cease-and-desist 
proceedings.
The ushering in of what appears to be a new era of the SEC 
as active and enthusiastic proponent of the “gatekeeping” role 
of attorneys, raises serious questions.  While academicians and 
practitioners have debated the consequences of this shift, a 
detailed examination of what the SEC is actually doing in fact 
has been lacking.  This Note seeks to focus on a compendium of 
real-life post-Sarbanes SEC enforcement actions, and to evaluate 
trends and consider conclusions.  Some of the questions that 
arise are as follows:    
What is the nature of the activity that the SEC considers 
volative of the “gatekeeper” function and worthy of sanctions? 
What is the tone and tenor of the SEC’s charging rhetoric 
when pursuing lawyers for perceived lapses? 
What are the practical effects for the practicing bar of 
trying to balance the attorney’s deeply engrained obligation to 
represent a client zealously and the newly-minted “gatekeeper” 
duties that presumably run in favor of the more diffuse and 
abstract “public interest”?   
Finally, is aggressive enforcement by a quasi-prosecutorial 
agency such as the SEC the right vehicle to reconcile the 
tension between the often contradictory and competing interests 
that the practicing attorney must grapple with in guiding a 
4client through often murky and gray areas between the client’s 
self-interest and the outer limits of what law and regulation 
will tolerate? 
II. NATURE OF THE SEC ACTIONS EXAMINED HEREIN 
A substantial number of SEC actions against lawyers post 
Sarbanes-Oxley have been cases directly linking the lawyer to 
financial or accounting fraud through his/her omitting to 
furnish material information or providing false information to a 
company’s independent auditors. The SEC justifies these actions 
as consistent with Sarbanes-Oxley’s policy of improving the 
quality, transparency and integrity of corporate financial 
reporting as well as fitting comfortably within the SEC’s view 
of the securities lawyer as gatekeeper. Thus, as we discuss in 
detail in Section III below, the SEC initiated civil injunctive 
and administrative proceedings against the inside general 
counsel of a public company for his alleged “failure to fulfill 
his gatekeeper role” to provide material information regarding 
the legality of a key accounting transaction to the company’s 
audit committee, board of directors and independent auditors 
thereby allegedly enabling the company to file a materially 
false quarterly financial report. The SEC charged violations of 
Exchange Act §13(a) and Rules 12b-20, 13b2-2 and 13a-13.4
4 SEC v. John E. Isselmann, Jr., SEC Litigation Release No. 18896 (Sept. 
24, 2004) 
5Similarly, the SEC initiated a 102(e) proceeding against the 
inside general counsel of a public company for allegedly 
facilitating the company’s fraudulent revenue enhancement scheme 
by making false representations to the company’s outside 
auditors in violation of §10(b) and Rule 10b-5 as well as 
certain Exchange Act §13 reporting provisions.5 See Section III 
below. For a full discussion of post Sarbanes-Oxley SEC actions 
against lawyers directly linking the lawyer to financial or 
accounting fraud through his/her omitting to furnish material 
information or providing false information to a company’s 
independent auditors see Section III below. 
There have also been a substantial number of SEC actions 
against lawyers post Sarbanes-Oxley that address a wide variety 
of alleged violations of the federal securities laws in a wide 
diversity of factual settings that link the lawyer less directly 
or not at all to financial or accounting fraud.  
In January, 2005, the SEC brought a cease-and-desist action 
against Silicon Valley search-engine Google and its inside 
general counsel in connection with the company’s alleged failure 
to register more than $80 million in stock option grants and 
related stock issuances to employees and consultants from 2002 
to 2004 in violation of §5 of the Securities Act. The SEC 
 
5 In the Matter of Jonathan B. Orlick, Esq., Securities Exchange Act 
Release No. 51081 (Jan. 26, 2005) 
6contended that the general counsel knew, but did not advise 
Google’s board of directors, that significant questions existed 
with respect to the availability of exemptions from registration 
for the option grants and stock issuances, and therefore the 
board was unaware of the resulting risks of potential illegality 
and related liabilities.6 See Section V below. In July, 2004, the 
SEC sued bond counsel in federal court for allegedly issuing 
favorable legal opinions with respect to a series of municipal 
bond underwritings despite his knowledge that the bond proceeds 
were being wrongfully commingled and diverted.7 See Section VII 
below. In August, 2003 the SEC charged in an administrative 
proceeding that inside counsel of an investment adviser was 
aware of material disciplinary actions against the chairman and 
controlling person of his firm but failed to file amendments to 
Forms B-D and ADV disclosing these actions.8 In June 2004, the 
SEC alleged that inside general counsel of a public company 
manipulated stock option exercise dates without regard to the 
stated terms of the company’s stock option plans to enable 
certain senior executives, including himself, to profit unfairly 
at the company’s expense. Capitalizing on the extended time 
period in effect before the enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley for 
 
6 In the Matter of Google, Inc. and David C. Drummond, Esq., Securities 
Act Release No. 8523 (Jan. 13, 2005) 
7 SEC v. Kasirer, et al, 04 Civ. No. 4340 (N.D.Ill., Jul. 1, 2004) 
8 In the Matter of Steven L. Hunt, Esq., Securities Exchange Act Release 
No. 48330 (Aug. 13, 2003) 
7filing the forms on which executives were required to report 
stock purchases, the general counsel allegedly “cherry picked” 
the exercise dates during this period so as to reduce the cost 
of the exercise to the executive. The SEC charged violations of 
the anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws.9 In 
November, 2004, the SEC filed a complaint in Florida federal 
court charging that a company’s outside securities lawyer 
deceived the company’s stock transfer agent into removing 
certain restrictive legends from company stock certificates.10 
We have included only a very few brief examples of SEC 
actions against lawyers in this Introduction. A wide variety of 
post Sarbanes-Oxley SEC actions against lawyers in diverse 
factual settings are discussed at Sections III-VII below. These 
SEC actions target lawyers involved in one or more of the 
following activities:  
1. Lawyers directly involved in financial or accounting fraud 
through omitting to furnish material information or providing 
false information to a company’s independent auditors. See 
Section III below. 
2. Lawyers preparing and filing false and misleading 
Forms 12b-25. See Section IV below. 
 
9 SEC v. Symbol Technologies, Inc., et al, 04 Civ. No. 2276 (S.D.N.Y., 
Jun. 3, 2004) 
10 SEC v. Simmons, et al, 04 Civ. No. 2477 (M.D.Fla., Nov. 15, 2004) 
83. Lawyers’ activities in connection with unregistered 
distributions of securities. See Section V below. 
4. Lawyers participating in the preparation and filing of 
false and misleading Forms 10-K, 10-Q, 8-K, 10 and 13D. See 
Section VI below. 
5. Lawyers issuing improper legal opinions. See Section VII 
below. 
And the corporate securities bar has been warned that there is 
more to come. Mr. Cutler emphasized in his above quoted speech:  
We have more to do in this area. Based on our current 
investigative docket, I think you can expect to see 
one or more actions against lawyers who, we believe, 
assisted their clients in engaging in illegal late 
trading or market timing arrangements that harmed 
mutual fund investors. We are also considering actions 
against lawyers, both in-house and outside counsel, 
who assisted their companies or clients in covering up 
evidence of fraud, or prepared, or signed off on, 
misleading disclosures regarding the company’s 
condition. One area of particular focus for us is the 
role of lawyers in internal investigations of their 
clients or companies. We are concerned that, in some 
instances, lawyers may have conducted investigations 
in such a manner as to help hide ongoing fraud, or may 
9have taken actions to actively obstruct such 
investigations.11 
Many of the actions briefly noted in this Introduction 
were referred to in the context of lawyers as gatekeepers in 
Mr. Cutler’s speech quoted above and in speeches by other 
senior SEC officials. The current enforcement climate with 
respect to securities lawyers under Sarbanes-Oxley has been 
summarized as follows:  
In the current enforcement climate following 
implementation of the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 
securities attorneys acting on behalf of public 
companies carry important “gatekeeper” obligations, 
top Securities and Exchange Commission enforcement 
officials said April 15, [2005.]  
On a panel at the 25th Annual Ray Garrett 
Corporate and Securities Law Institute at the 
Northwestern University School of Law, Merri Jo 
Gillette, director of the SEC’s Midwest Regional 
Office, said securities attorneys, in this gatekeeper 
role, have a legal, professional, and ethical duty to 
guide their corporate clients toward compliance with 
the law.  
 
11 Speech by Stephen M. Cutler, The Themes of Sarbanese-Oxley as 
Reflected in the Commission’s Enforcement Program, UCLA School of Law, 
Los Angeles, CA, (Sep. 20, 2004) 
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In extraordinary circumstances, they are also 
obligated to report material violations of the law by 
public issuers, Gillette added. She said the 
commission would not hesitate to take enforcement 
action against attorneys who ignore these gatekeeper 
obligations.  
At the same time, Gillette said the SEC does not 
expect securities attorneys to betray confidences or 
to spy on their clients. The agency also does not wish 
to restrain attorneys from vigorously defending their 
public company clients and providing them with the 
best legal advice possible.  
“There is a natural tension between wanting to 
hold lawyers to an appropriate standard in terms of 
their roles as gatekeepers, but at the same time 
avoiding a chilling effect,” Gillette told attorneys. 
“We want people to seek legal advice and get good 
legal advice and take it.”  
Gillette said the SEC attempted to spell out 
attorneys’ gatekeeper obligations within Sarbanes-
Oxley in the Part 205 rules under Section 307. Among 
other provisions, the rules require that attorneys 
practicing before the commission report evidence of 
11
material violations of law to the issuer’s chief legal 
officer or chief executive officer.  
Gillette said attorneys unclear about their 
obligations should review the Part 205 rules and also 
look at the commission’s recent litigation against 
David Drummond, general counsel at the search-engine 
company Google Inc. Drummond entered into a settlement 
with the SEC in connection with the company’s alleged 
failure to register options grants granted to 
employees between 2002 and 2004.  
Peter Bresnan, SEC associate enforcement 
director, noted that the role of gatekeeper will often 
place attorneys at odds with management. At the same 
time, Bresnan reminded attorneys that Sarbanes-Oxley 
views the issuer as the client, not the issuer’s 
directors, officers, or employees.12 
The somewhat harsh manner in which the SEC has 
reconciled the “natural tension” between “gatekeeping” and 
traditionally vigorous independent advocacy in an 
adversarial system in a free society is manifested perhaps 
most clearly in the SEC actions discussed below. In 
studying these actions and evaluating their effect on 
practicing securities lawyers, it is important to remember 
 
12 37 BNA Sec. Reg. & Law Rep. 728 (Apr. 25, 2005) 
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that as a practical matter the securities lawyer charged in 
an SEC proceeding against him/her personally faces 
devastating consequences regardless of the outcome. The 
initiation of the charges alone may be enough to destroy 
the lawyer’s professional reputation and livelihood. 
Ultimate exoneration will do very little to resuscitate the 
lawyer’s career.  
We turn now to a discussion of the various SEC actions 
against lawyers following the enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley on 
July 30, 2002. As one of our most distinguished jurists has 
written “[t]he prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, 
and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by the law.” 
Holmes, Path of the Law.13 The following analysis is what the SEC 
is “doing in fact” with respect to securities lawyers.  
III. SEC ACTIONS AGAINST LAWYERS – DIRECT LINK TO FINANCIAL 
OR ACCOUNTING FRAUD – FURNISHING FALSE INFORMATION TO 
AUDITORS
As stated in the Introduction, a substantial number of SEC 
actions against lawyers post Sarbanes-Oxley have been cases 
alleging a direct link between the lawyer and financial or 
accounting fraud through his/her omitting to furnish material 
information or providing false information to a company’s 
independent auditors. The SEC justifies these actions as 
consistent with Sarbanes-Oxley’s policy of improving the quality, 
transparency and integrity of corporate financial reporting as 
13 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 461 (1897) 
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well as fitting comfortably within the SEC’s view of the 
securities lawyer as a gatekeeper.
In SEC v. John E. Isselmann, Jr.,14 the SEC alleged that the 
failure of the inside general counsel of a public company “to 
fulfill his gatekeeper role was a cause of [the company’s] 
reporting materially false financial results to the public and 
violated the Commission’s rule barring officers and directors of 
public companies from omitting to state or causing another person 
to omit to state a material fact to their accountants.” The 
lawyer’s “failure to fulfill his gatekeeper role” was his alleged 
failure to provide important information to his company’s audit 
committee, board of directors and auditors regarding a 
significant accounting transaction that enabled the company to 
report a profit rather than a loss. A full description of the 
SEC’s allegations enables one to assess the appropriateness of 
the Commission’s action against counsel.
6. Isselmann, age 35, resides in Portland, 
Oregon, and is licensed to practice law in the State 
of Oregon. He served as General Counsel of ESI from 
May 2000 until his resignation in August 2003. 
14 04 Civ. No. 1350 (D.Ore., Sept. 23, 2004) 
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FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
7. ESI is an Oregon corporation with its 
principal place of business in Portland. The Company 
makes manufacturing equipment for electronics and 
other high technology companies. ESI common stock is 
registered with the Commission pursuant to Section 
12(g) of the Exchange Act and trades on the Nasdaq 
National Market. 
8. In order to meet external expectations that 
ESI would be profitable, the Company’s CFO and 
Controller engaged in a scheme to fraudulently inflate 
ESI’s financial results for its quarter ended August 
31, 2002. ESI’s CFO and Controller reduced expenses 
and increased ESI’s bottom line by $1 million by 
secretly and unilaterally deciding to eliminate vested 
retirement and severance benefits in ESI’s Asian 
offices (which included primarily Japan, but also 
Taiwan and Korea). This accounting transaction 
violated generally accepted accounting principles 
because ESI could not legally eliminate the benefits 
as it had purported to do. The accounting transaction 
enabled the CFO and the Controller to avoid a loss and 
report a profit in line with external expectations. 
15
 9. Isselmann was not involved, present, or 
consulted when the CFO and the Controller made the 
accounting decision described above.  
10. On September 17, 2002, Isselmann participated 
in a meeting with ESI’s Audit Committee and auditors 
to review the quarterly financial results, including 
the financial impact of eliminating the retirement and 
severance benefits. During the meeting, ESI’s CFO told 
the Audit Committee that the Japanese benefits were 
not legally required and that the decision to 
eliminate them had been approved by legal counsel. 
During the same discussion, Isselmann identified ESI’s 
legal counsel in Japan, causing an Audit Committee 
member to believe that outside legal counsel had 
reviewed the decision. Although Isselmann was unaware 
that the CFO had decided to eliminate the benefits in 
order to fraudulently inflate ESI’s financial results, 
and did not question the CFO about his statements, 
Isselmann was aware that at that time he had not 
reviewed or approved the decision to eliminate 
benefits nor had he, as General Counsel, sought any 
outside legal review of the issue. At the conclusion 
of the meeting, the Audit Committee approved the 
inclusion of the $1 million transaction relating to 
16
the benefits in ESI’s financial results for the 
quarter.  
11. During the same time frame, Isselmann was 
informed that ESI’s auditors had been told that the 
elimination of the benefits had legal support. In 
connection with the auditors’ review of ESI’s 
quarterly financial results, ESI provided the auditors 
with a written memorandum stating that the benefits 
had been eliminated because ESI was under “no legal 
obligation” to pay them and that the change was 
approved by ESI’s CFO and CEO. Isselmann subsequently 
received a copy of this memorandum and was told that 
it had been written for the auditors. However, 
Isselmann did not speak directly with the auditors and 
did not inform them that he had not reviewed the 
retirement benefits issue and that he had not retained 
outside counsel to do so.  
 12. On October 3, 2002, Isselmann sought legal 
advice from ESI’s counsel in Japan on whether ESI 
could eliminate the benefits.  
13. On October 7, 2002, the outside counsel 
informed Isselmann in writing that ESI could not 
unilaterally eliminate its retirement and severance 
benefits in Japan and that if ESI wanted to terminate 
17
the benefits it was required to first consult with and 
obtain the consent of ESI’s Japanese employees. As 
Isselmann was aware, ESI had neither consulted the 
Japanese employees nor obtained their consent to the 
elimination of their retirement benefits. Despite the 
contradiction with information Isselmann had been told 
had been written for ESI’s auditors, Isselmann did not 
speak directly with the auditors. Nor did Isselmann 
provide the information to the Audit Committee, 
despite the fact that they had questioned the legal 
review of the matter.  
14. ESI’s Disclosure Committee met on October 7, 
2002 to review and ensure the accuracy of ESI’s 
quarterly report to the Commission on Form l0-Q. 
Isselmann, other ESI officers and employees, ESI’s 
external auditors, and its Portland-based outside 
corporate counsel attended the meeting, which had been 
arranged by Isselmann. During the meeting, Isselmann 
tried to raise the issue of the termination of the 
Asian retirement benefits. However, the CFO objected 
and, as a result, Isselmann provided no further detail 
and did not provide the written legal advice to the 
participants in the meeting. After the meeting, 
Isselmann spoke with the CFO and provided him with a 
18
copy of the written legal advice. The CFO subsequently 
signed the Form 10-Q, which included the $1 million 
increase to the bottom line resulting from the 
elimination of the benefits.  
15. On October 15, 2002, ESI filed its Form 10-Q, 
reporting net income of $158,000 and earnings per 
share of $0.01 for the quarter. Before the Form 10-Q 
was filed with the Commission, an Audit Committee 
member questioned Isselmann about the language 
describing the elimination of the benefits and the $1 
million accounting entry. Isselmann failed to convey 
the legal advice to the Audit Committee member in 
response. As a result, the Form l0-Q was not changed. 
16. On March 31, 2003, Isselmann learned that the 
CFO (who had been promoted to CEO in December 2002) 
had eliminated the accrued liability for the benefits 
late at night after learning of an accounting error 
that negatively impacted earnings. On the night of 
March 31, 2003, Isselmann reported to ESI’s outside 
counsel his suspicions that the CFO had engaged in 
misconduct. The next day Isselmann informed the Audit 
Committee. 
17. On April 1, 2003, after receiving the written 
legal advice, the Audit Committee commenced an 
19
internal investigation. In August 2003, following the 
completion of an internal investigation by its Audit 
Committee, ESI restated its financial results for the 
quarter ended August 31, 2002. The previously recorded 
accounting transaction was reversed and the accrued 
liability of $1 million for the payment of Asian 
retirement and severance benefits was restored. 
There are a number of observations to be made with respect 
to the SEC’s allegations against Isselmann.  
First, the SEC specifically used the words “gatekeeper 
role” in the complaint. While these words have been used in 
speeches by senior SEC officials, they have rarely been used in 
formal court complaints probably because of an absence of legal 
precedent supporting the use of these words with respect to 
lawyers.  The inclusion of the term in a charging document 
emphasizes the extent to which the SEC seeks to formalize and 
institutionalize the phrase “gatekeeper” as a term of art to 
describe in shorthand the newly broadened obligations of 
counsel.  We view this evolution of the use of the term from SEC 
speeches to actual pleadings as more than a matter of mere 
semantics. 
Second, Isselmann, a 35-year-old lawyer, is not charged 
with illegal actions but rather with a failure to act under 
20
somewhat difficult and ambiguous circumstances requiring in 
essence an interpretation of Japanese law. 
Third, the SEC’s complaint appears to imply that one of 
Isselmann’s derelictions of duty was permitting ESI’s CFO to 
report on advice of Japanese legal counsel to ESI’s audit 
committee and auditors in the meeting on September 17, 2002 
(Referred to in paragraph 10 of the complaint).  As set out in 
the complaint, during that meeting ESI’s CFO told the audit 
committee that the decision to eliminate the Japanese benefits 
had “been approved by legal counsel.”  The complaint goes on to 
say that Isselmann “identified ESI’s legal counsel in Japan, 
causing an Audit Committee member to believe that the outside 
legal counsel had reviewed the decision.”  According to the 
complaint, at the time of the September 17 meeting, Isselmann 
had no reason to believe that the CFO was acting improperly and 
therefore presumably had no reason to doubt the CFO’s assertion 
that the CFO had obtained legal advice from Japanese counsel.  A 
corporation in a global economy often seeks and obtains legal 
opinions from multiple counsel on multiple topics related to 
multiple jurisdictions.  
A reasonable inference from the complaint language is that 
the CFO reported that he, the CFO, had obtained advice from 
legal counsel in Japan that the benefits could be eliminated.  
It appears that at the September 17, 2002 meeting Isselmann 
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merely identified the name of the Japanese counsel.  It appears 
somewhat overzealous to argue that Isselmann in that 
circumstance was somehow duty bound to stop the meeting and 
emphasize that Isselmann could not personally vouch for whatever 
the CFO had learned from Japanese counsel, because he, 
Isselmann, had not spoken to Japanese counsel directly, and 
because he, Isselmann, had not done his own research of Japanese 
law to reach an independent opinion with regard to the issue.   
Of course, the fact that Japanese counsel would later issue 
a written opinion denying the appropriateness of the elimination 
of the benefits was not a fact that Isselmann knew or could have 
known in the September 17, 2002 meeting.   
The general insinuation the SEC appears to be making in 
this section of the complaint is troubling.  Not only are 
attorneys to be “gatekeepers”, but they seem to be expected to 
check, double-check, and confirm every legal opinion that 
corporate officers claim to have obtained from all other 
counsel.    
Fourth, while the language of the complaint is not a model 
of clarity, one could infer that it was not until March 31, 
2003, that Isselmann first learned of the circumstances under 
which the then CFO had eliminated the accrued liability, and 
first realized that misconduct had occurred. Once Isselmann was 
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aware of the fraudulent activities by top management he 
immediately informed the audit committee and outside counsel.  
Fifth, Isselmann consented to a civil injunction, a $50,000 
fine and a cease-and-desist order, and the effect of the action 
on him personally and professionally was probably quite 
devastating.  This seems to be a rather harsh sanction in light 
of the facts set out in the complaint. 15 
The majority of the SEC’s actions against lawyers post 
Sarbanes-Oxley for omitting to furnish material information or 
providing false information to a company’s independent auditors 
appear to have more justification based upon their facts than 
the circumstances in Isselmann. Of course, one must always 
remember that all of these actions against counsel have been 
terminated through consents incorporating only the SEC’s 
allegations rather than having been tested in the full crucible 
of an adversarial proceeding. The reason for the unanimity of 
these resolutions by consent is that the lawyer’s reputation and 
livelihood have already been destroyed by the charges alone, and 
the lawyer has little to gain from a long and expensive fight 
against the government. 
The SEC’s civil injunctive action and administrative 
proceeding under its Rule 102(e) against Gemstar-TV Guide’s 
 
15 SEC v. John E. Isselmann, Jr., SEC Litigation Release No. 18896 (Sept. 
24, 2004) 
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inside general counsel, executive vice president and director, 
Jonathan B. Orlick, emphasized that Orlick facilitated Gemstar’s 
fraudulent revenue enhancement scheme by providing false 
representations to Gemstar’s auditors. The SEC’s complaint 
alleged “that from June 1999 through September 2002, Gemstar 
overstated its total revenues by at least $248 million to meet 
its ambitious projections for revenue growth from IPG licensing 
and advertising...; that Orlick participated in Gemstar’s 
fraudulent recording and disclosure of certain IPG licensing and 
advertising revenue...; that Orlick knew, but omitted to 
disclose, that Gemstar was improperly recognizing and reporting 
material amounts of licensing revenue from two companies...; 
that Orlick participated in Gemstar’s fraudulent recognition of 
this licensing revenue by repeatedly signing false management 
representation letters to Gemstar’s auditors regarding the 
status of negotiations with one of the companies [and that] 
Orlick failed to disclose material information regarding certain 
of Gemstar’s IPG revenue. The complaint charge[d] Orlick with 
securities fraud, falsifying Gemstar’s books and records, aiding 
and abetting Gemstar’s reporting and record-keeping violations, 
and lying to auditors, in violation of Sections 10(b), 13(a), 
13(b)(2)(A), and 13(b)(5) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
24
and Rules l0b-5 12b-20, 13a-1, 13a-13, 13b2-1, and 13b2-2 
thereunder.”16 
Orlick “was permanently enjoined by consent from violating 
the antifraud and other provisions of the federal securities 
laws and ordered to pay a total of $305,510.62 in disgorgement, 
interest, and penalties. Additionally, Orlick was prohibited 
from serving as an officer or director of a public company for 
ten years. Orlick... also agreed, in a related administrative 
action, to be suspended from appearing or practicing before the 
SEC as an attorney. Orlick consented to the relief without 
admitting or denying the SEC’s allegations.”17 
A case where inside general counsel was alleged not to have 
provided false information to a company’s independent auditors 
but appears to have been a key participant in a fraudulent 
revenue enhancing scheme is SEC v. Bruce Hill, et al.18 The SEC’s 
complaint summarized the allegations against Hill. 
1. This enforcement action involves material            
overstatements of revenue during 1998 by Inso 
Corporation (“Inso”), a publicly-traded company then 
headquartered in Boston, Massachusetts. Between 
approximately September 1998 and April 1999, 
 
16 SEC Litigation Release No. 19047 (Jan 21, 2005) 
17 SEC Litigation Release No. 19047 (Jan 21, 2005).  See also In the 
Matter of Jonathan B. Orlick, Esq., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 
51081 (Jan. 26, 2005); SEC v. Henry C. Yuen, et al, 03 Civ. No. 4376 
(C.D. Calif., Jan. 21, 2005) 
18 02 Civ. No. 11244 (D. Mass., Jun. 21, 2002) 
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Defendants Bruce Hill (“Hill”), then general counsel 
of Inso, and Graham Marshall (“Marshall”), then vice 
president and general manager of Inso’s electronic 
publishing division, engaged in a fraudulent revenue 
recognition scheme designed to falsely boost the 
amount of Inso’s third quarter and annual revenues for 
1998.  
2. By on or about September 30, 1998, the last day of 
Inso’s 1998 fiscal third quarter, Inso’s sales team 
had failed to conclude a sale of $3 million of 
software licenses to US Airways Group, Inc. (“US 
Airways”) that Inso had been negotiating since at 
least early 1998. Although no distributor had been 
involved in this deal prior to the end of the third 
quarter of 1998, on or about September 30, 1998, 
Marshall and others at Inso attempted to locate a 
distributor who would place an immediate order for the 
$3 million of software licenses in order to allow Inso 
to record revenue from the transaction in the third 
quarter.       
3. On or about September 30, 1998, Marshall contacted 
a potential distributor for the US Airways deal -- a 
software company located in Malaysia (“the Malaysian 
distributor”). Hill and Marshall then entered into a 
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phony $3 million sales transaction with the Malaysian 
distributor. The sale transaction was a sham because 
of an undisclosed oral side agreement between Hill and 
Marshall and the Malaysian distributor which provided 
that Inso would sell the software to US Airways 
directly and that the Malaysian distributor would not 
have to pay for its supposed $3 million purchase.  
4. Hill and Marshall took further actions after the 
third quarter of 1998 to cover up the sham nature of 
the third quarter transaction with the Malaysian 
distributor. Among other things, Hill orchestrated the 
providing of $4 million in letters of credit to the 
Malaysian distributor to finance the payment of the 
third quarter receivable, caused a false board 
resolution to be provided to Inso’s bank purporting to 
authorize the letters of credit, and gave false 
information to Inso’s chief financial officer (“CFO”) 
and outside auditors about the purpose of the letters 
of credit. Marshall provided false information and 
documents to Inso’s CFO to conceal the purpose of a 
payment to the Malaysian distributor.... 
6. In March 1999, after conducting an internal 
investigation, Inso restated its financial results for 
the first three quarters of 1998, reversing 
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approximately $3 million in revenue from the 
fraudulent transaction entered into by Hill and 
Marshall in the third quarter of 1998.  
7. As a result of the acts and omissions of Hill, 
Marshall, and Paxhia (Inso’s CEO), Inso’s financial 
statements included in Form 10-Q filed with the 
Commission for the third quarter of 1998, and 
referenced in a Form S-3 filed in connection with an 
offering of stock in December 1998, and summarized in 
a press release issued in October 1998, materially 
overstated Inso’s third quarter revenue by 
approximately $3 million. Inso’s internal books and 
records also materially misrepresented the company’s 
true financial condition.  
8. By engaging in the acts and practices alleged in 
this Complaint, Defendants Hill and Marshall, directly 
or indirectly, violated the antifraud, periodic 
reporting, books and records, and internal accounting 
controls provisions of the federal securities laws. 
Hill was later convicted of committing perjury in his 
investigative testimony before the SEC regarding the above 
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events. As of June 7, 2005 the SEC’s action against Hill was 
still pending.19 
Isselmann, Orlick and Hill all involved inside counsel 
allegedly participating in or failing to act in the face of 
financial and accounting frauds through omitting to furnish 
material information or providing false information to their 
company’s independent auditors. The underlying accounting frauds 
all allegedly involved schemes to enhance their company’s 
revenues by “cooking the books.” Three additional post Sarbanes-
Oxley SEC actions against lawyers involving these same elements 
were In the Matter of James A. Fitzhenry,20 In the Matter of 
David S. Pearl21, and In the Matter of Elliot S. Fisher.22 
Fitzhenry consented to a five year suspension under Rule 
102(e) from appearing or practicing before the SEC as an 
attorney as well as a cease-and-desist order under Exchange Act 
Rule 13b2-2. According to the SEC’s allegations (which Fitzhenry 
neither admitted nor denied as set out in the SEC’s 
Administrative Order), Fitzhenry was general counsel for FLIR 
Systems, Inc. (“FLIR”).  FLIR designs and manufactures thermal 
imaging and broadcast camera systems that detect infrared 
radiation.  During a 1998 year-end audit of FLIR’s financial 
statements, FLIR’s outside auditors, PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP 
 
19 See SEC Litigation Release No. 19253 (Jun. 7, 2005) 
20 Securities Exchange Act Release No. 46870 (Nov. 21, 2002) 
21 Securities Exchange Act Release No. 48257 (Jul. 30, 2003) 
22 Securities Exchange Act Release No. 46954 (Dec. 6, 2002) 
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(“PwC”) selected certain sales that FLIR had recognized as 
revenue for testing.  PwC sent an accounts receivable 
confirmation, which the sales representative refused to return.  
Fitzhenry personally attempted to negotiate with the company’s 
independent sales representative to obtain a binding and 
unconditional agreement to purchase the goods for which the 
company had already booked the revenue, but the independent 
sales representative refused to agree.  According to the SEC, 
therefore, Fitzhenry was aware that certain sales were 
conditional in nature and should not have been booked as 
revenue.  Fitzhenry signed management representation letters to 
PwC asserting that the independent sales representative had made 
a fixed commitment to purchase the goods.   
In the David S. Pearl administrative proceeding referred to 
above, counsel also was suspended under Rule 102(e) from 
appearing or practicing before the SEC as an attorney. The SEC’s 
Administrative Order contained findings which Pearl neither 
admitted nor denied.  According to the SEC, Pearl, an attorney, 
knowingly helped to prepare phony and back-dated agreements and 
other documents that created an appearance of rapid financial 
growth in his employer issuer’s 1998 fiscal year.   
In the Elliot S. Fisher administrative proceeding referred 
to above, counsel was suspended from appearing or practicing 
before the SEC as an attorney. In addition, counsel was 
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criminally convicted of making false and misleading statements 
to auditors. The SEC’s Administrative Order asserted that Fisher 
participated in a conspiracy to commit securities fraud and make 
false and misleading statements to auditors.  It appears that 
the SEC’s action followed a criminal prosecution of Fisher in 
which Fisher was convicted of the same activity.  Fisher was 
sentenced to six months in prison.  An SEC injunctive action 
against Fisher is described in SEC Litigation Release No. 17880 
(Dec. 6, 2002).23 
The allegations in SEC v. Universal Express, et al,24 
contained the elements of counsel’s link to an accounting fraud 
through counsel’s furnishing misleading information to the 
company’s independent auditors. In lieu, however, of a scheme to 
enhance revenues by “cooking the books”, an element which we 
have seen emphasized in the other proceedings summarized in this 
Section, Universal Express had a somewhat different twist. Here 
inside counsel allegedly helped to facilitate an illegal 
unregistered distribution of 500 million shares of his company’s 
stock to the investing public.  According to the SEC, Universal 
Express disseminated false information to the investing public, 
aided by the efforts of its attorney, Chris Gunderson.  The 
SEC’s allegations include, inter alia, that Gunderson 
 
23 SEC v. Arthur L. Toll, et al, 98 Civ. 2325 (E.D. Pa., May 4, 1998) 
2404 Civ. 02322 (S.D.N.Y., Mar. 24, 2004) 
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participated in the scheme to cause Universal to sell company 
stock at substantial discounts to insider “resellers” who then 
immediately flipped the stock for a substantial risk-free 
profit.  The resulting dilution led to a fall in the stock 
price, which was then artificially stabilized by false 
announcements of funding commitments.  The SEC’s allegations 
assert that Gunderson was directly involved in wrongdoing 
including preparing false legal opinions, backdating stock 
purchase letters to auditors and other overtly improper conduct.  
As of the date of this writing, the SEC’s action against 
Gunderson was still pending.  
As stated above, a substantial number of SEC actions against 
lawyers post Sarbanes-Oxley have been cases directly linking the 
lawyer to financial or accounting fraud through his/her omitting 
to furnish material information or providing false information to 
a company’s independent auditors. In addition, there has been the 
occasional similar case of a company’s inside counsel omitting to 
furnish material information or providing false information to a 
company’s outside counsel,25 or an outside lawyer omitting to 
furnish material information or providing false information to a 
company’s attorney.26 
25 See In the Matter of Steven Woghin, Esq., Securities Exchange Act 
Release No. 50653 (Nov. 10, 2004) 
26 See SEC Litigation Release No. 19002, SEC v. Jack D. Weiss, 04 Civ. 
9889 (S.D.N.Y., Dec. 17, 2004) 
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IV. SEC ACTIONS AGAINST LAWYERS – PREPARING AND FILING 
FALSE AND MISLEADING NOTICES OF LATE FILING – FORMS 
12B-25
If perhaps the largest number of SEC actions against lawyers 
post Sarbanes-Oxley have been cases of lawyers omitting to 
furnish material information or providing false information to a 
company’s independent auditors, see Section III above, perhaps 
the most interesting case explored in depth post Sarbanes-Oxley 
has involved questions raised in the context of a prominent law 
firm’s filing an allegedly false and misleading Form 12b-25. A 
court ordered independent examiner’s report filed in SEC v. 
Spiegel, Inc.27 and made public by court order addresses certain
issues surrounding a law firm’s filing an allegedly false and 
misleading Form 12b-25.
Spiegel was a Delaware corporation, headquartered in 
Illinois, with 10% of its equity represented by non-voting Class 
A shares publicly traded on NASDAQ and 90% of its equity 
represented by voting Class B shares privately held by a single 
German businessman, Michael Otto. Otto owned and controlled a 
global retail empire consisting of 89 companies in 21 countries 
employing 79,000 people. Spiegel, which consisted of three retail 
subsidiaries selling apparel, home furnishings and other 
merchandise and a wholly owned credit card bank, was the empire’s 
single American division. Spiegel’s American management team was 
controlled from Germany by a German executive board committee.
27 2003 WL 22176223 (N.D.Ill., 2003) 
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 In 1999 in order to boost lagging retail sales, Spiegel 
embarked upon an “easy credit” plan aimed at high risk retail 
customers and financed by Spiegel’s wholly owned credit card 
bank. Within a short period the subpar credit scheme faltered, 
Spiegel’s credit charge-off rates doubled, and Spiegel’s debt 
mushroomed by 35%. Spiegel defaulted on its loan covenants and 
hundreds of millions of dollars of long-term debt became 
immediately due and payable. Spiegel’s efforts to reorganize its 
finances failed.
Spiegel’s annual report on Form 10-K for the year 2001 was 
required to be filed with the SEC by the end of March, 2002. 
Shortly before the report was due, KPMG, Spiegel’s independent 
accountants, advised Spiegel that it would receive a “going 
concern” opinion – an auditor’s statement that there is a 
substantial doubt about the company’s ability to continue as a 
going concern. The independent examiner concluded: “Spiegel 
feared the impact a going concern opinion would have on vendors 
selling goods to Spiegel on credit, as well as on Spiegel’s 
investors and employees. Its answer was simply not to file its 
annual report and not to make disclosure of its auditors’ going 
concern position and other material adverse information. The 
decision to make this response came against the recommendation 
of Spiegel’s Chicago-based management, its attorneys Kirkland & 
Ellis and its auditors at KPMG. However, as time went by, these 
managers and professionals did little to press their point. And 
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the advisers relied on by Spiegel’s Hamburg-based decision 
makers, White & Case, failed to support the recommendation to 
file. Spiegel then failed to file its annual report for almost a 
year and also failed to file its 2002 quarterly reports, and 
only did so as the SEC’s Enforcement Division was launching an 
investigation of the company.”28 
In June, 2002, NASDAQ delisted Spiegel for its continuing 
failure to file its Form 10-K. Finally, in February, 2003 
Spiegel filed the delinquent Form 10-K and ten days later filed 
in bankruptcy.  
 The independent examiner made the following evaluations 
with respect to the performance of counsel.  
D. Involvement of Spiegel’s Professional Advisers  
In the present case, the SEC charged Spiegel with 
fraud, and Spiegel consented (without admitting or 
denying liability) to a fraud injunction against the 
company. When a fraud charge hits a public company, 
the question naturally arises whether its professional 
advisers could have done anything to prevent this 
“train wreck” that hurt the company and its 
shareholders, creditors and employees.  
Spiegel’s Legal Advisers. In evaluating the 
performance of Spiegel’s lawyers, it is useful to 
 
28 2003 WL 22176223 (N.D.Ill., Sept. 15, 2003) 
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consider rules recently adopted and other rules 
recently proposed by the SEC under Section 307 of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, even though these SEC rules were 
not in effect at the time of the conduct here. Under 
SEC rules effective August 5, 2003, lawyers 
representing a public company must report “up the 
ladder”--as high as the board of directors, if 
necessary--if the lawyers “become aware” of “evidence” 
of a “material violation” of federal or state 
securities law or a material breach of fiduciary duty 
by the company (or its officer, director, employee or 
agent). 17 C.F.R. Part 205.  
In addition, the SEC has proposed (but not yet 
adopted) so-called “noisy withdrawal” rules that would 
require lawyers to assess whether the company has made 
an “appropriate response within a reasonable time” to 
the matter the lawyer has reported up the ladder, and 
if not, whether “substantial injury” to financial 
interest or property of the issuer or investors has 
occurred or is likely. An outside attorney must then 
“withdraw forthwith from representing the issuer,” and 
tell both the company and the SEC that the withdrawal 
was for “professional considerations.” An inside 
attorney must cease participation in the matter. Both 
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outside and inside attorneys must also disaffirm to 
the SEC any document the attorney assisted in 
preparing that “may be” materially false or 
misleading.  
Robert Sorensen joined Spiegel as its general counsel 
at the end of June 2001. He brought in the firm of 
Kirkland & Ellis as principal outside counsel, in 
place of Rooks Pitts, to provide additional depth in 
corporate and securities matters. Rooks Pitts 
continued to represent Spiegel in securitization and 
other matters. As described above, by mid-May 2002, 
Kirkland & Ellis had plainly advised Spiegel that it 
was violating the law by not filing its Form 10-K, and 
that this illegal act could have serious consequences, 
including action by the SEC. Sorensen plainly 
concurred in this advice. The advice reached Spiegel’s 
management, including its president Martin Zaepfel, 
who was also a member of Spiegel’s board committee, 
which had the power to act for the full board. By the 
end of May, Zaepfel reported the advice to Michael 
Otto and Michael Cruesemann, the other two members of 
the board committee. Kirkland & Ellis also repeated 
this advice by phone to Spiegel’s audit committee at 
the end of May. Plainly, Kirkland & Ellis and Sorensen 
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reported “up the ladder” to Spiegel’s audit committee 
and its board committee.  
However, this was a case where reporting “up the 
ladder” was not enough. The advice from the lawyers 
here was rejected by Spiegel’s audit and board 
committees, and the material information that should 
have reached investors was kept under wraps.  
White & Case became involved in Spiegel’s affairs as 
counsel for Spiegel’s “sole voting shareholder,” 
Michael Otto and his corporate vehicles. [FN29] 
Through its Hamburg partner Urs Aschenbrenner, White & 
Case “interpreted” for the Otto interests the advice 
received from Spiegel’s U.S. legal advisers, and it 
clearly played a substantial role in helping Otto and 
the Spiegel board committee evaluate that advice. 
Aschenbrenner consulted with White & Case’s New York 
office on Spiegel issues, and lawyers from the firm’s 
New York office were substantively involved on various 
Spiegel matters--again as representatives of Spiegel’s 
sole voting shareholder--during much of 2002.  
FN29. Michael Otto and his family owned all 
of Spiegel’s voting stock through an 
intermediary, SHI, and also owned a separate 
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finance entity that made capital 
contributions to Spiegel.  
Aschenbrenner began accompanying Cruesemann to  
meetings with Spiegel’s lender banks in Spring 2002,  
and also attended Spiegel’s delisting hearing before 
Nasdaq on May 17, 2002. On May 31, 2002, the day 
Spiegel’s audit and board committees made the final 
decision not to file the Form 10-K, Aschenbrenner was 
invited to be present at the audit committee meeting, 
and the audit committee had Aschenbrenner phone 
Kirkland & Ellis on a speakerphone for the  
committee to get advice. Aschenbrenner was heard to 
challenge Kirkland & Ellis’ advice on the need to file 
Spiegel’s Form 10-K and the consequences of non-
filing. In the days following the May 31, 2002 
meeting, it appears that neither Aschenbrenner nor his 
New York partners did anything to express their 
agreement with Kirkland & Ellis’ advice. 
Whatever the conclusion as to the lawyers’ performance 
around the time of the May 31, 2002 audit and board 
committee meetings, the question naturally arises as 
to what the lawyers did to press Spiegel to make its 
required SEC filings through the balance of 2002--or 
otherwise to update, supplement or correct disclosures 
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made in Spiegel’s Forms 12b-25 and/or its press 
releases. There does not appear to be a record of 
either Kirkland & Ellis or White & Case advising 
Spiegel of the dire consequences of its continuing 
failure to file its Form 10-K and make full disclosure 
to investors after May 31, 2002.  
After May 2002, it appears that Spiegel’s German 
directors considered Kirkland & Ellis and Sorensen, 
along with the rest of Spiegel’s U.S. management, to 
be “black painters”--meaning pessimists who were 
exaggerating the seriousness of the situation. Over 
the summer, Cruesemann suggested that Kirkland & 
Ellis, and perhaps Sorensen, be replaced. The effort 
to replace Kirkland & Ellis failed only when U.S. 
management pointed out the cost of bringing in a new 
firm to draft documentation for the refinancing and 
other pending matters.  
At the same time, while ostensibly still only counsel 
for Spiegel’s sole voting shareholder, White & Case 
assumed a prominent role in negotiating on Spiegel’s 
behalf with its banks on the refinancing effort, with 
the OCC on FCNB [credit card bank] issues, and with 
the insurer of the Spiegel securitizations. While 
still not technically retained as Spiegel’s counsel, 
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White & Case clearly enjoyed the confidence of 
Spiegel’s sole voting shareholder, and an effort by 
White & Case to report “up the ladder” to Spiegel’s 
audit and board committees that it shared the views of 
the “black painters” Kirkland & Ellis and Sorensen 
could well have caused Spiegel to comply with its 
obligations and avoid a fraud charge from the SEC.  
As the months went by, Kirkland & Ellis continued to 
prepare and file Spiegel’s Forms 12b-25 providing 
official notice of Spiegel’s failure to file its 
remaining quarterly reports (Form 10-Q) for the 
balance of 2002. All of these recited that Spiegel was 
not filing its periodic reports because it was ‘not 
currently in compliance with its 2001 loan covenants 
and is currently working with its bank group to amend 
and replace its existing credit facilities,’ and thus 
[was] ‘not in a position to issue financial statements 
... pending resolution of this issue.’ Of course, as 
Kirkland & Ellis knew, the real reason why Spiegel was 
not filing its periodic reports was that it did not 
want to disclose KPMG’s going concern qualification 
and other material bad facts and circumstances 
threatening Spiegel’s survival. [FN30]
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FN30. Rule 12b-25(a) provides that a Form 
12b-25 “shall contain disclosure” of the 
reasons “in reasonable detail” why “all or 
any required portion” of a periodic report 
cannot be filed within the prescribed time 
period. Moreover, the rule states that it 
applies only to an “inability” to file a 
periodic report, not an unwillingness to 
file. Here, Spiegel was unwilling, not 
unable, to file its periodic reports, and 
the reason for its unwillingness was its 
desire not to tell investors, vendors and 
employees about KPMG’s going concern 
position. And Spiegel’s unwillingness 
persisted not just for the 15 calendar day 
extension afforded by the rule, but for a 
period stretching from April 2002 until 
February 2003. Form 12b-25 itself contains a 
warning (just below the signature and just 
above the instructions for the form) that 
underscores the importance of accuracy in 
completing the form:  
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“ATTENTION: Intentional misstatements or 
omissions of fact constitute Federal 
Criminal Violations (See 18 U.S.C. 1001).” 
None of Spiegel’s legal advisers withdrew--”noisily” 
or otherwise--from representing Spiegel. If the SEC’s 
proposed withdrawal rule had then been in effect, the 
SEC would have been alerted to take action sooner, and 
investors would have received information they could 
have acted on to make informed investment decisions 
about Spiegel. In this case, the absence of a “noisy 
withdrawal” requirement allowed Spiegel to keep 
investors and the SEC in the dark.29 
A number of points are relevant with respect to these 
evaluations set forth by the independent examiner. 
First there is a question with respect to the status and 
the value as precedent of the entire 100 page independent 
examiner’s report. When this issue was raised with the court, 
the court advised that readers should look to the Court Order 
for guidance as to the nature of its directive regarding the 
examiner’s report. The Court Order states:   
ORDER  
This cause coming to be heard on the motion of 
Plaintiff, Securities and Exchange Commission 
 
29 2003 WL 22176223 (N.D.Ill., Sept. 15, 2003) (footnote omitted) 
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(“Commission”), for an Order making the Independent 
Examiner’s September 5, 2003 Report available to the 
public (“Order”), the Court having considered the 
Commission’s motion and the Court being advised in the 
premises, finds:  
1. That this Court has jurisdiction over the subject 
matter of this case and there is good cause to believe 
it will have jurisdiction over all parties hereto.  
2. On March 11, 2003, as amended on March 27, 2003, 
the Honorable Judge Zagel entered an Order (the “Final 
Order”) appointing Stephen J. Crimmins to serve as the 
Independent Examiner in this matter. The Independent 
Examiner’s mandate was to provide the Court with a 
written report discussing Spiegel’s financial 
condition and identifying any material accounting 
irregularities.  
3. Pursuant to the Final Order the Independent  
Examiner submitted his report (“the Independent  
Examiner’s Report”) to Judge Zagel in chambers on  
September 5, 2003.  
4. Pursuant to the Court’s Order, the Independent 
Examiner’s Report discussed Spiegel’s financial 
condition and identified material accounting 
irregularities.  
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5. Nothing in the Final Order prohibits the  
Commission or Spiegel from disclosing the  
Independent Examiner’s Report to the public.  
6. The information contained in the Independent  
Examiner’s Report is material to the investing public 
and it is in the public interest to make the 
Independent Examiner’s Report available to the public.  
I.  
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that, effective September 15,
2003, the Independent Examiner’s report, submitted to 
this Court on September 5, 2003, shall be available to 
the public.  
II.  
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, effective September 15,
2003, the Clerk of the Court shall include the 
Independent Examiner’s Report as part of the filings 
for this matter.  
III.  
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, effective September 15,
2003, the Clerk of the Court shall post the 
Independent Examiner’s Report on the website for the 




IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Independent  
Examiner shall provide the Clerk of the Court for the 
Northern District of Illinois a copy of the report in 
an electronic format appropriate for such posting.  
V.  
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff Commission and 
Defendant Spiegel may disseminate the Independent 
Examiner’s Report through other means.30 
Since the Court Order describes the information contained 
in the report as “material to the investing public” and mandates 
wide public dissemination, the Court would appear to be 
contemplating a considerable degree of precedental importance. 
On the other hand, since the Court’s mandate to the examiner was 
limited to a “written report discussing Spiegel’s financial 
condition and identifying any material accounting 
irregularities”, the examiner’s analysis and evaluation of the 
lawyers’ performance appears to be substantially beyond the 
scope of his mandate from the court. Moreover, as the examiner 
admits, the SEC’s 17 C.F.R. 205 series of rules promulgated 
under Sarbanes-Oxley pursuant to which the examiner is 
evaluating the lawyers’ performance were not in effect at the 
time of the lawyers’ conduct; and the “noisy withdrawal” rules 
 
30 2003 WL 22176223 (N.D.Ill., Sept. 15, 2003) 
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which the examiner refers to as some sort of panacea were never 
adopted. In sum, while important and very useful, the examiner’s 
report may be treated with a degree of caution as binding 
precedent with respect to the conduct of securities lawyers. 
Second, the role of White & Case is interesting. White & 
Case represented Spiegel’s sole voting shareholder, Michael 
Otto, and his corporate vehicles. In this representation White & 
Case was not subject to the same strictures regarding lawyers’ 
conduct with respect to Spiegel as was Kirkland & Ellis, 
Spiegel’s SEC counsel. The advantages to controlling persons of 
corporations to retain their own private counsel who can render 
advice unburdened by many of the SEC rules promulgated under 
Sarbanes-Oxley are starkly illustrated in the Spiegel situation.  
Third, the examiner emphasizes that neither Kirkland & 
Ellis nor White & Case pressed Spiegel to make full disclosure 
to investors after Spiegel’s audit and board committees made 
their final decision on May 31, 2002 not to file the Form 10-K. 
Moreover, the examiner states that while not “technically 
retained” as Spiegel’s counsel, an effort by White & Case to 
“report up the ladder” could well have caused Spiegel to comply 
with its SEC reporting obligations. These observations tend 
toward placing corporate counsel in the undesirable role of a 
corporate overseer or corporate policeman, a role that has been 
specifically rejected by the SEC, see Section I above. 
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Finally, after carefully studying Spiegel, one may take 
issue with some of the examiner’s evaluations of the performance 
of counsel. Kirkland and Ellis’ Form 12b-25 filings, while not a 
model for corporate disclosure, may be deemed acceptable given 
an extraordinarily difficult set of circumstances. As the 
filings disclosed, Spiegel was in fact ”not filing its periodic 
reports because it was ‘not currently in compliance with its 
2001 loan covenants and is currently working with its bank group 
to amend and replace its existing credit facilities,’ and thus 
[was] ‘not in a position to issue financial statements ... 
pending resolution of this issue.’”31 If the considered opinion 
of the company’s executive governing board was that disclosure 
of the going concern qualification would destroy the company, it 
is difficult to see how this additional disclosure would have 
protected shareholders. Moreover, Kirkland & Ellis were not 
principals, they were only lawyers; and in light of the clear 
directive from their client regarding disclosure their only 
other option was resignation. It is also difficult to see how 
their resignation would have protected shareholders. Also, even 
the examiner admits that Kirkland & Ellis clearly reported “up 
the ladder.” As regards White & Case, its representation of 
Michael Otto and his corporate vehicles may also be deemed 
acceptable given the existing circumstances. White & Case had no 
 
31 2003 WL 22176223 (N.D.Ill., Sept. 15, 2003) 
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duty to support Kirkland & Ellis’ positions and no duty to 
police Spiegel with respect to its SEC filing responsibilities. 
White & Case’s duty was to represent Michael Otto and his 
interests, and it is certainly arguable that White & Case 
fulfilled this duty. 
In Spiegel when the client chose to ignore counsel’s advice 
to disclose material transactions, counsel determined to 
continue in its position. Sarbanes-Oxley, however, was not yet 
in effect. By contrast, in SEC v. TV Azteca S.A. de C.V., et
al,32 a case not involving Form 12b-25, when the client chose to 
ignore counsel’s advice to disclose material transactions, 
counsel resigned, citing its obligations under the newly 
applicable §307 of Sarbanes-Oxley. The SEC’s Release for the TV 
Azteca case cogently summarized the allegations.  
According to the SEC, a TV Azteca officer and director, 
Ricardo Salinas Pliego (“Salinas”) arranged to purchase $325 
million worth of indebtedness from Unefon, a TV Azteca 
subsidiary.  At the time Salinas purchased the indebtedness, he 
was aware that Unefon was in negotiations with another large 
telecom company which would provide substantial cash to Unefon 
enabling Unefon to pay off the full amount of indebtedness that 
Salinas had purchased at a substantial discount.  Salinas 
 
32 1:05 Civ. 00004 (D.D.C., Jan. 4, 2005), SEC Litigation Release No. 
19022 (Jan. 4, 2005) 
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purchased the indebtedness at a discount because, 
hypothetically, he was taking on risk that the indebtedness 
would never be repaid.   
The reality, however, was that Salinas had inside 
information that the repayment of the debt was assured.  Only 
three months after the deal closed with the other telecom 
company, Salinas received full payment of his debt netting $109 
million in profit.  In various filings and public statements 
during this course of events, TV Azteca and its management 
discussed publicly the Unefon debt transactions while either 
failing to disclose Salinas’ involvement, or in several 
instances, falsely denying Salinas’ involvement.   
TV Azteca’s U.S. legal counsel discovered one news article 
containing Salinas’ false denial of his involvement with the 
Unefon debt transaction.  U.S. counsel advised another director 
and officer of TV Azteca that corrective disclosure was 
necessary.  Despite the falsity of the statement, and the advice 
of counsel, the directors and officers of TV Azteca did nothing 
to correct Salinas’ false denial.  U.S. counsel then resigned 
citing its obligations under Section 307 of Sarbanes-Oxley.  
Subsequently TV Azteca issued a press release confirming that 
Salinas was involved in the debt transactions. 
For another case (like Spiegel) involving corporate 
counsel’s allegedly filing false and misleading notices of late 
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filing on Forms 12b-25 see SEC v. Craig Scott.33 The Commission’s 
Release summarized its allegations. 
According to the SEC, Craig Scott was the CFO and general 
counsel at FFP Marketing Company, Inc. (“FFP”). FFP was a Texas-
based owner and operator of convenience stores and gas stations 
whose stock was listed on the American Stock Exchange.  The SEC 
alleged that Scott committed securities fraud, and that he aided 
and abetted FFP’s violations of SEC reporting rules.  Scott 
neither admitted nor denied the SEC’s allegations, but settled 
the case by agreeing to pay a civil monetary penalty of $25,000.   
The SEC’s complaint alleged that the company was plagued by 
accounting lapses leading to an internal investigation.  
According to the SEC, certain late filing notices falsely 
attributed losses that were actually related to the company’s 
accounting lapses to other business conditions.  Scott allegedly 
prepared what the SEC termed false and misleading notices of 
late filing and caused FFP to file them.        
V. SEC ACTIONS AGAINST LAWYERS – LAWYERS’ ACTIVITIES IN 
CONNECTION WITH UNREGISTERED DISTRIBUTIONS OF 
SECURITIES
If one of the most important common themes or threads 
permeating SEC actions against lawyers post Sarbanes-Oxley is 
the theme that securities lawyers representing public companies 
carry important “gatekeeper” obligations, see Section I, above, 
 
33 3:05 Civ. 0302 (N.D.Tex., Feb. 14, 2005), SEC Litigation Release No. 
19077 (Feb. 14, 2005) 
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then deciding whether or not to allow an issuer and/or its 
controlling persons to distribute the issuer’s securities to the 
investing public would appear to be the quintessential example 
of counsel guarding the gate to the public securities markets. 
Indeed, top SEC officials recently advised securities lawyers 
who might be “unclear” about their post Sarbanes-Oxley 
gatekeeper obligations to review the new 17 C.F.R. 205 series of 
SEC rules and also to study the Commission’s January 13, 2005 
action against David Drummond, the inside general counsel of 
search-engine company Google, Inc.34 Because of the SEC’s 
emphasis upon the importance of its decision regarding Drummond 
we quote a description of the SEC’s findings. 
 




1. Google, a Silicon Valley search engine technology 
company, issued over $80 million worth of stock 
options to the company's employees and consultants 
from 2002 to 2004 without registering the offering and 
without providing financial information required to be 
disclosed under the federal securities laws. As a 
result, Google employees and other persons accepted 
Google securities as part of their compensation 
without certain detailed financial information about 
the company. By issuing the options without 
registering the offering and without the legally 
required disclosures, Google violated the securities 
registration provisions of Section 5 of the Securities 
Act. As described below, Google's General Counsel, 
David C. Drummond, caused Google to violate these 
provisions. 
B. Respondents 
2. Google, Inc. is a Delaware corporation with its 
principal executive offices located in Mountain View, 
California. Founded in 1998, Google is an Internet 
search engine technology provider. On April 29, 2004, 
Google filed a registration statement for an initial 
public offering of securities with the Commission, 
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which became effective on August 19, 2004. The 
company's common stock is registered with the 
Commission pursuant to Section 12(g) of the Exchange 
Act, and is quoted on the Nasdaq Stock Market. 
3. David C. Drummond, age 41, resides in San Jose, 
California. Drummond is Google's General Counsel, Vice 
President of Corporate Development and Secretary. He 




4. Under Section 5 of the Securities Act of 1933, a 
company cannot offer or sell securities to the public 
without first registering the offering with the 
Commission or having a valid exemption from 
registration. Registration ensures that potential 
investors will have detailed information about the 
issuer's finances and business, and allows the 
Commission to review the company's disclosures.  
5. Rule 701 promulgated under the Securities Act 
provides an exemption from registration for certain 
issuers offering and selling stock options (or other 
securities) to employees and consultants under 
compensatory benefit plans. However, Rule 701 requires 
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(among other things) that any company issuing more 
than $5 million in stock options over a 12-month 
period provide detailed financial statements and other 
disclosures to the option recipients. The Rule allows 
privately-held companies to compensate their employees 
with securities without incurring the obligations of 
public registration and reporting, while ensuring that 
essential information is provided to employees.
Google's Failure To Comply With Rule 701 
6. Since its inception, Google has granted stock 
options to its employees and consultants as a form of 
compensation. Under Google's stock option plans, 
Google's Board of Directors granted the company's 
employees and consultants options to buy a certain 
number of Google unregistered shares at an exercise 
price set by Google's Board. Although the stock 
options were not registered, Google relied on Rule 701 
of the Securities Act to exempt those securities from 
the registration requirements of the federal 
securities laws.  
7. In September 2002, Google became aware that its 
continued issuance of stock option grants might reach 
levels requiring financial disclosures under Rule 701. 
Google temporarily stopped issuing stock grants. In 
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contrast to its chief competitors, Google was a 
private company, and did not have to report its 
financial results and other significant business 
information to the public in filings with the 
Commission. Google viewed the public disclosure of its 
detailed financial information as strategically 
disadvantageous, as Drummond recognized, and the 
company was concerned that providing option recipients 
with the financial disclosures required by Rule 701 
could result in the disclosure of this information to 
the public at large and, significantly, to Google's 
competitors.  
8. By January 2003, Google was again considering 
granting stock options to its employees. Drummond 
learned that the stock option grants being considered 
for approval by Google's Board might cause Google to 
grant more than $5 million worth of options in a 12-
month period and therefore would require Google to 
provide option recipients with financial disclosures 
under Rule 701. Drummond, in consultation with outside 
counsel and personnel in Google's legal department, 
determined that other exemptions for certain of the 
stock option grants permitted Google to issue the 
option grants without registering the securities or 
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providing disclosures otherwise required by Rule 701. 
For example, Rule 506 of Regulation D of the 
Securities Act exempts from registration certain sales 
to "accredited investors" (including investors meeting 
a particular level of net worth or annual income). 
Drummond also considered the potential applicability 
of Section 4(2) of the Securities Act, an exemption 
from registration for certain private securities 
offerings. Finally, Drummond determined that, even if 
it were later determined that his analysis of the 
applicability of other registration exemptions was 
incorrect, Google could make an offer of rescission to 
the option holders. 
9. Drummond concluded that a sufficient number of 
options had been issued to Google's employees and 
executives who were accredited investors under Rule 
506 to avoid exceeding Rule 701's $5 million 
threshold, at least for the immediate future. 
10. Drummond attended a January 2003 meeting of 
Google's Board of Directors and advised the Board to 
approve a new stock option plan for employee and 
consultant option grants going forward. Drummond also 
advised that the Board issue stock option grants 
pursuant to that new stock option plan, which grants 
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were to become effective when the plan became 
effective in February. Drummond did not report to the 
Board that issuing the new option grants might cause 
Google to exceed the $5 million disclosure threshold 
of Rule 701, and that Google would be relying on other 
exemptions from the registration requirements.  
11. At the January 2003 meeting, Google's Board 
approved the new stock option plan and the option 
grants pursuant to that plan, and the additional 
options became effective on February 7, 2003. Contrary 
to Drummond's expectations, the option grants resulted 
in Google exceeding Rule 701's $5 million disclosure 
threshold. Even excluding option grants arguably 
exempt from registration under Rule 506, the dollar 
value of options granted by Google over the prior 12-
month period exceeded $5 million. Google, however, 
failed to provide the financial disclosures and other 
information mandated by Rule 701. Absent compliance 
with Rule 701, the options issued during this 12-month 
period were not exempt from registration, and Google's 
securities issuance violated the registration 
provisions of Section 5.  
12. Between February and May 2003, Google continued to 
issue additional stock options to its employees. By 
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unanimous written consent, Google's Board approved 
additional stock option grants on February 28, 2003, 
March 31, 2003, April 24, 2003, and May 9, 2003. As a 
result of these option grants, the value of securities 
issued by Google during a 12-month period was 
approximately $11 million, far in excess of the $5 
million disclosure threshold of Rule 701, yet Google 
did not provide the legally required disclosures to 
the option recipients. Throughout this period, Google 
failed to monitor its stock option grant levels, and 
failed to determine whether the company was in 
compliance with Rule 701.  
13. In approximately June 2003, Drummond learned that 
Google probably had exceeded the $5 million disclosure 
threshold of Rule 701. Drummond further believed that 
there were not likely to be enough stock option 
recipients who qualified as accredited investors to 
render the securities exempt from registration, and 
thus the company could not avoid the disclosure 
obligations of Rule 701 by relying on Rule 506.  
14. Drummond believed that Google's stock option 
grants might be exempt under Section 4(2) of the 
Securities Act, an exemption available for certain 
private placements of securities.  
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15. At a June 2003 meeting, Google's Board of 
Directors adopted two new stock option plans allowing 
for the issuance of additional options beginning in 
July 2003. Drummond discussed the need for the stock 
option plans, but he did not advise the Board that 
Google's option grants would exceed the $5 million 
disclosure threshold of Rule 701 or of the risk that 
other exemptions from registration may not apply. 
Based in part on Drummond's advice, Google issued 
additional options in the months following the Board 
approval exceeding the $5 million disclosure 
threshold. 
16. Google's option grants did not qualify for 
exemption under Section 4(2). Among other things, 
Google offered millions of dollars worth of stock 
options to all of its employees without considering 
the financial sophistication of each employee, and did 
not provide its employees with the information found 
in a registration statement.  
17. For the twelve months ended December 31, 2003, 
Google issued approximately $49 million worth of stock 
options. Pursuant to the stock option plans adopted in 
June 2003, Google issued an additional $33 million 
worth of options in the first four months of 2004, 
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prior to the company's filing of a registration 
statement for its initial public offering. None of 
these option grants were accompanied by the 
disclosures required by Rule 701. 
18. On August 4, 2004, Google filed a Form S-1 with 
the Commission to register a rescission offer for the 
stock option grants and the purchase of shares upon 
the exercise of options made between September 2001 
and June 2004 to Google's employees and consultants. 
The Form S-1 was declared effective on November 24, 
2004. However, the rescission offer does not cure a 
violation of Section 5. 
D. Legal Conclusion 
19. Section 5(a) of the Securities Act prohibits the 
use of any means or instruments of transportation or 
communication in interstate commerce or of the mails 
to sell a security unless a registration statement is 
in effect as to such security. Section 5(c) of the 
Securities Act prohibits the use of any means or 
instruments of transportation or communication in 
interstate commerce or of the mails to offer to sell 
or offer to buy a security unless a registration 
statement has been filed as to such security.  
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20. Google offered to sell and sold its securities 
without a registration statement filed or in effect 
and without a valid exemption from registration. As a 
result of the conduct described above, Google 
violated, and Drummond caused Google to violate, 
Sections 5(a) and 5(c) of the Securities Act. The 
Commission previously has charged attorneys for 
causing Section 5 violations. See, e.g., In the matter 
of John L. Milling, Esq., Securities Act Rel. No. 33-
8189 (Feb. 3, 2003).35 
Drummond and Google neither admitted nor denied the SEC’s 
findings and consented to the imposition of an administrative 
Cease-and-Desist Order regarding future violations of Securities 
Act §5.  
There are a number of points that are relevant with respect 
to the SEC’s action in Google. 
First, it seems somewhat unfair to target counsel for 
disciplinary action. Management determined to issue the options. 
The board of directors authorized the issuance. And counsel, 
after consulting with Google’s outside lawyers as well as 
Google’s inside legal department, did a reasonable job of 
patching together a series of exemptions. In fact, the SEC did 
 
35 In the Matter of Google, Inc. and David C. Drummond, Securities Act 
Release No. 8523 (Jan. 13, 2005) 
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not base its enforcement action on Drummond’s legal judgment 
regarding the registration issues. Rather, the Commission’s 
action was focused upon Drummond’s failure to raise the 
registration exemption issues together with the material 
attendant risks with Google’s board of directors. 
Second, counsel had to be sensitive to the fact that the 
company was in a very difficult position. To have refused to 
issue the options would have shut out employees who had labored 
long and hard for what was fairly certain to be, and did in fact 
become, a once-in-a-lifetime bonanza. Moreover, to have refused 
to issue the options would probably have deprived the company of 
valuable personnel. On the other hand, to have issued a 
prospectus would have meant the disclosure of confidential 
Google information which, in management’s judgment, would have 
been “strategically” and competitively “disadvantageous.” Under 
these circumstances, counsel’s advice was probably the best 
course of action for the company, particularly when a future 
rescission offer was available to mitigate any significant 
financial exposure.  
Finally, when one studies the opinion in Google one tends 
to conclude that the primary reason Drummond and the company 
settled was to expedite the SEC’s clearance of the company’s 
initial public offering. Indeed, one SEC staff member’s reported 
rationale for the Drummond proceeding – “that Mr. Drummond 
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exposed himself to liability because he assumed a 
‘businessman’s’ decision-making role with respect to Securities 
Act compliance through his failure to advise Google’s board of 
the legal risks of his determination regarding compliance” – is 
somewhat less than overwhelming.36 
The SEC’s action against John L. Milling, Esq. referenced in 
the last sentence of the Google action quoted above, is also 
somewhat less than overwhelming.37 The Commission’s findings, 
which Milling neither admitted nor denied, described the 
proceeding.
A. RESPONDENT  
Milling, age 69, is a resident of Tenafly, New Jersey, 
has been licensed to practice as an attorney in New 
York since 1957, and in New Jersey since 1960, and has 
a specialized practice in securities law. During the 
period relevant to this proceeding, Milling was legal 
counsel to LinkNet, Inc. ("LinkNet") and LinkNet de 
America Latina, Ltd. ("Latina"). Milling's services 
included opining on the securities registration 
requirements of securities offerings by LinkNet and 
Latina.  
 
36 Board Member, SEC Enforcement Actions Target Internal Counsel, from 
Hogan & Hartson LLP (Apr. 7, 2005) 
37 In the Matter of John L. Milling, Esq., Securities Act Release No. 
8189 (Feb. 3, 2003) 
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B. FACTS  
1. LinkNet is a Utah corporation located in Salt Lake 
City, Utah. Latina is a Nevada corporation located at 
the same office as LinkNet in Salt Lake City, Utah.  
2. From at least 1999 through 2000, LinkNet conducted 
an offering of its securities to persons located 
throughout the United States, selling those securities 
through a division of LinkNet created, staffed and 
operated for that purpose. In a report on Form D filed 
by LinkNet with the Commission, LinkNet stated it 
raised $9,659,663 from 1246 investors through the 
offering.  
3. During 2000, Latina conducted an offering of its 
securities to persons located throughout the United 
States, selling its securities through a division of 
Latina created, staffed and operated for that purpose. 
In a report on Form D filed by Latina with the 
Commission, Latina stated it raised $7,252,248.50 from 
655 investors through the offering.  
4. Milling prepared drafts of the Forms D referred to 
in paragraphs 2 and 3 above.  
5. In conducting their offerings, neither LinkNet nor 
Latina complied with requirements of Rule 506 of 
Regulation D [Rule 506 of Regulation D of the 
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Securities Act exempts from registration certain sales 
to “accredited investors” which includes investors 
meeting a particular level of net worth or annual 
income], or any other provisions that exempt or except 
securities offerings from the registration 
requirements of the federal securities laws.  
6. In June 2000, upon learning the staff of the 
Commission was investigating LinkNet and Latina for 
possible violations of the federal securities laws, 
and upon receiving information concerning possible 
violations of the federal securities laws in 
connection with the offerings of LinkNet and Latina 
stock, Milling recommended that LinkNet and Latina 
conduct a joint rescission offer to the purchasers of 
securities in those offerings.  
7. However, Milling advised LinkNet and Latina that 
the rescission offer not be registered with the 
Commission in order to expedite the rescission offer.  
8. Milling drafted the rescission offer which was 
reviewed and edited by persons associated with LinkNet 
and Latina, including Allen Johnson, the president of 
LinkNet and chairman of the board of Latina. Johnson 
signed the rescission offer on behalf of both 
companies.  
66
9. The joint rescission offer was conducted in the 
Fall of 2000 by LinkNet and Latina without having been 
registered with the Commission.  
10. Based on the foregoing, the Commission finds that 
Milling caused violations of Sections 5(a) and 5(c) of 
the Securities Act. 
Milling, like Drummond in Google, consented to the 
imposition of an administrative Cease-and-Desist Order regarding 
future violations of Securities Act §5.
The SEC’s action against Michael L. Labertew for his 
activities in connection with four unregistered offerings of 
securities carries considerably more substance than the SEC’s 
actions against either Drummond or Milling. Labertew prepared 
court petitions and opinions to free up for public distribution 
without SEC registration over 47 million shares of Rocky Mountain 
Energy Corporation as part of a manipulative scheme orchestrated 
by the issuer’s president. Labertew received 410,220 shares in 
the transactions which he sold into the public markets for 
$62,088. As a result of his actions, Labertew was enjoined from 
violations of Securities Act §5, ordered to disgorge $62,088 with 
interest, and ordered to pay a civil penalty of $25,000.38
Labertew was also suspended from appearing or practicing before 
the SEC as an attorney. The SEC’s findings, which Labertew 
38 SEC v. Rocky Mountain Energy Corporation, 03 Civ. No. 1133 (N.D.Tex., 
Dec. 30, 2003); SEC Litigation Release No 18522 (Dec. 23, 2003) 
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neither admitted nor denied, were contained in the Commission’s 
Administrative Order under Rule 102(e).  
A. At all relevant times, Labertew, age 39, was a 
resident of Salt Lake City, Utah, where he was 
licensed to practice as an attorney. 
B. On December 30, 2003, a final judgment was entered 
against Labertew, permanently enjoining him from 
future violations of Sections 5(a) and 5(c) of the 
Securities Act of 1933 in the civil action entitled 
Securities and Exchange Commission v. Rocky Mountain 
Energy Corporation et. al, case number H-03-CV-1133 in 
the United States District Court for the Southern 
District of Texas. Labertew was also ordered to pay 
disgorgement of $62,088, prejudgment interest of 
$2,525, post-judgment interest at the statutory rate, 
and a civil money penalty of $25,000. 
C. The Commission's complaint alleges that, from July 
2002 to April 2003, Rocky Mountain Energy Corporation 
issued over 47 million shares of common stock, or 
approximately 60% of its outstanding shares, in four 
unregistered offerings. The shares were purportedly 
issued in exchange for the outstanding stock of four 
private companies in reliance on the exemption from 
registration found in Section 3(a)(10) of the 
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Securities Act.39 In fact, according to the complaint, 
the vast majority of the shares issued in these 
offerings were not issued to acquire the four 
companies; rather, they were issued and sold to raise 
capital for Rocky Mountain and for the personal 
benefit of its CEO. Accordingly, the four offerings 
did not qualify for the Section 3(a)(10) exemption, or 
any other exemption from registration. For each 
offering, the complaint alleges that Labertew prepared 
and filed a petition on behalf of Rocky Mountain with 
a Utah state court seeking an order approving the 
purported exchange offer transaction. After obtaining 
the court's approval of each offering, Labertew 
prepared a legal opinion letter to Rocky Mountain's 
transfer agent. In addition, the complaint alleges 
that Labertew received a total of 410,220 Rocky 
Mountain shares issued in the four offerings, which he 
sold into the market for $62,088.40 
VI. SEC ACTIONS AGAINST LAWYERS – LAWYERS PARTICIPATING IN 
THE PREPARATION AND FILING OF FALSE AND MISLEADING 
FORMS 10-K, 10-Q, 8-K, 10 AND 13D.
39 Section 3(a)(10) provides an exemption from registration for offers 
and sales of securities in certain exchange transactions such as when 
securities are exchanged for other securities, claims, or property 
interests.  Before an issuer can rely on the exemption, certain 
conditions must be met, including approval by a court or authorized 
governmental entity that the terms and conditions of the exchange are 
fair.   
40 In the Matter of Michael L. Labertew, Securities Exchange Act Release 
No. 49039 (Jan. 8, 2004). 
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In Section III above we addressed SEC actions against 
lawyers involved in providing false information to a company’s 
independent auditors. In Section IV above we discussed SEC 
actions against lawyers preparing and filing false and misleading 
Forms 12b-25. In Section V above we examined SEC actions against 
lawyers for their activities in connection with unregistered 
distributions of securities. In this Section VI we analyze SEC 
actions against lawyers for participating in the preparation and 
filing of false and misleading Forms 10-K, 10-Q, 8-K, 10 and 13D. 
One of the most important SEC actions against a lawyer 
for participating in the preparation and filing of a false and 
misleading Form 10-K and Form 10-Q involved Stanley P. 
Silverstein, the former vice president, general counsel and 
secretary of The Warnaco Group. During the relevant period 
Warnaco was a Fortune 500 company that traded on the New York 
Stock Exchange. The SEC made the following findings in its 
administrative proceeding against Silverstein which he neither 
admitted nor denied.
C. Facts  
1. Inventory Restatement  
a. Discovery of Inventory Overstatement  
Warnaco is one of the largest manufacturers and 
distributors of apparel in the United States. It 
designs and manufactures a broad line of intimate 
apparel, sportswear, swimwear and other clothing under 
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a variety of well-known brand names. Warnaco's 
Intimate Apparel Division ("IAD") is a leading 
supplier of intimate apparel to department and 
specialty stores in the United States.  
During the period at least 1997 through early 
1999, the cost accounting and internal control systems 
at IAD were severely outdated and inadequate, given 
the size of the division's operations. IAD operated on 
a standard cost system that had not been updated in 
decades. IAD did not have a perpetual inventory system 
or other means for accurately determining the value of 
its inventory on a regular basis. The division valued 
its inventory accounts only once a year, when the 
physical inventory count was taken mid-year and 
reconciled to the general ledger. Further, out-of-date 
and missing standard costs led to large and increasing 
variances between actual and standard cost. By the end 
of 1997, capitalized variances accounted for forty-two 
percent of the value of inventory at the division.  
As Warnaco's General Counsel, Silverstein became 
aware that IAD's accounting systems were antiquated. 
Silverstein also knew that, on the advice of its 
auditors, PwC, Warnaco hired PwC consultants to update 
and correct IAD's standard cost system ("the Standard 
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Cost Project") in late 1997. In August 1998, PwC 
informed the board and management, including 
Silverstein, that the Standard Cost Project had 
revealed that a material reduction in the value of 
IAD's inventory of $60 million or more might be 
required.  
In the Fall of 1998, IAD completed its annual 
physical inventory count and attempted to reconcile 
the value of the physical inventory to the value of 
the inventory on IAD's books. The reconciliation 
process confirmed the findings of the Standard Cost 
Project: the value of IAD's actual physical inventory 
was $60 million to $80 million less than the value 
recorded on IAD's internal records and publicly 
reported in Warnaco's periodic reports.  
b. PwC's Audit Work Confirms the Overstatement  
Warnaco informed PwC in late October or early 
November 1998 of the inventory discrepancy identified 
by the IAD reconciliation. Given the magnitude of the 
inventory discrepancy, the audit team informed 
Warnaco's senior management that PwC could not rely 
upon the company's books and records or internal 
control systems in determining the correct value of 
IAD's inventory. Instead, PwC created a new "valuation 
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model" to revalue IAD's inventory, bypassing IAD's own 
accounting systems.  
In the course of this work, PwC identified flaws 
in IAD's cost accounting system, including missing, 
incomplete and outdated standard costs, that had 
prevented the system from properly reducing the value 
of inventory recorded on Warnaco's books as inventory 
was sold. During a meeting in December 1998 and in 
subsequent discussions, PwC notified Warnaco's senior 
management, including Silverstein, of their findings. 
These findings were consistent with the errors the PwC 
consultants had identified in March 1998 during the 
Standard Cost Project.  
In February 1999, the auditors completed their 
work and determined that Warnaco's inventory was 
overvalued by $159 million. Warnaco sought to treat 
the overstatement as start-up costs that would be 
written off as part of the company's adoption of new 
accounting pronouncement Statement of Position ("SOP") 
98-5, which required companies to record start-up 
costs as they were incurred instead of amortizing them 
over time. However, PwC determined that the inventory 
overstatement could not be written off as start-up 
costs and informed the company that it would have to 
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restate its financial results for the preceding three 
years to correct the error.  
Over the course of two days in late February 
1999, Silverstein attended a series of meetings 
between PwC and Warnaco's senior management. During 
these meetings, senior management attempted to 
convince the auditors that Warnaco should be permitted 
to write off the overstatement as start-up costs under 
SOP 98-5. After reviewing the information provided by 
Warnaco in the light most favorable to the company, 
PwC determined that, at most, only $14 million of the 
overstatement arguably could be reclassified as start-
up costs. The remaining $145 million could not be 
written off as start-up costs.  
The auditors informed Silverstein and other 
members of Warnaco's senior management of this 
decision at the end of the day on Sunday, February 29, 
1999. Silverstein and other members of senior 
management were also present the next day, March 1, 
1999, when PwC informed Warnaco's board of directors 
that the inventory error could not be written off 
under SOP 98-5 and would require Warnaco to restate 
its financial statements for a three-year period.  
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As shown below, the restatement had a material 
impact upon the company's previously reported results 
for 1996, 1997, and the first three quarters of 1998: 
[Net income and Earnings per share declined by 281% 
for 1996, by 154% and 155% respectively for 1997, and 
by 26% and 51% respectively for the first three 
quarters of 1998.]...    
c. Warnaco's 1998 Annual Report on Form 10-K  
On April 2, 1999, Warnaco filed its annual report 
on Form 10-K for fiscal 1998. In this report, the 
company "revised" its financial results for fiscal 
1996-1998 to reduce inventory and increase cost of 
goods sold by $145 million, as required by GAAP. 
Warnaco continued, however, to insist misleadingly 
that the restatement was related to the company's 
adoption of SOP 98-5.  
In the annual report, the notes to the audited 
financial statements explained the restatement by 
claiming that the inventory "revision" was the result 
of "start-up related and production inefficiency 
costs" identified by the company during its adoption 
of new accounting standard SOP 98-5....  
The Form 10-K was misleading and inaccurate. The 
restatement was not the result of "previously 
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deferred" start-up costs and was not related to the 
company's adoption of SOP 98-5. Rather, the 
restatement was precipitated by a material failure of 
Warnaco's inventory accounting system. The annual 
report did not clearly explain to investors that 
Warnaco had restated its financial results for a 
three-year period to correct a $145 million inventory 
overvaluation, and did not disclose that this 
restatement was caused by the failure of the company's 
accounting system to properly deduct costs from 
inventory as goods were sold.  
As general counsel of Warnaco, Silverstein 
reviewed the fiscal 1998 Form 10-K and approved its 
filing. Silverstein knew or should have known that the 
disclosures contained in the Form 10-K 
mischaracterized the cause of the restatement. 
Silverstein knew or should have known that there were 
significant flaws in IAD's cost accounting and 
internal control systems. From his attendance at the 
meetings with PwC in late February and early March 
1999, Silverstein knew or should have known that 
Warnaco's auditors had determined the inventory 
overstatement could not be attributed to misclassified 
start-up costs. Silverstein also knew or should have 
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known that it was incorrect to imply that the 
restatement was related to the adoption of SOP 98-5.  
Warnaco did not correct the misleading disclosure 
until May 16, 2000, when it filed an amended 1998 Form 
10-K. The amended report removed all references to 
start-up related production and inefficiency costs and 
for the first time, informed investors that:  
Reclassifications and Restatement: 
. . . In connection with the fiscal 1998 
year-end closing, the Company determined 
that in fiscal 1996, 1997 and the first 
three quarters of 1998, as merchandise was 
sold, inventories were relieved at less than 
actual cost per unit, leaving an 
accumulation of inventory costs. As a 
result, costs related to [those periods] 
have been restated to reflect additional 
costs of goods sold[.] . . . This 
restatement resulted from flaws in the 
Company's Intimate Apparel Division 
inventory costing control system that have 
since been addressed.  
d. Silverstein's Bonus  
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As an executive of the company, Silverstein 
participated in Warnaco's Incentive Compensation Plan. 
The plan provided for bonuses of up to 100 percent of 
salary, based upon certain criteria. In 1998, 
executives at the company were eligible to receive a 
bonus if Warnaco met certain EBIT (earnings before 
interest and taxes), inventory turn, and cash flow 
targets.  
Warnaco met the 1998 cash flow target, but did 
not meet the inventory turn target. Warnaco did not 
meet the EBIT target, either, due to the effect of the 
$145 million restatement upon the company's income. 
However, Warnaco calculated the company's EBIT as if 
the restatement had never occurred. By doing so, 
Warnaco appeared to meet the EBIT target, resulting in 
larger bonuses for the executives, including 
Silverstein, than they should have received. As a 
result of the improper EBIT calculation, Silverstein 
received an additional $125,305 in Incentive 
Compensation for 1998.  
2. Improper Offset of Debt Against Cash in the 
Third Quarter of 2000  
In the Summer of 2000, due to its deteriorating 
financial situation, Warnaco was unable to meet the 
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financial covenants of its long-term debt, which 
totaled nearly $2 billion. The company sought and 
subsequently obtained waivers of the financial 
covenants from its banks. It then entered into a 
series of negotiations with its bank consortium to 
restructure its long-term debt. As Warnaco's general 
counsel, Silverstein participated in these 
negotiations as one of Warnaco's representatives. The 
negotiations culminated in an agreement between the 
banks and Warnaco that was signed on October 6, 2000.  
On November 2, 2000, Warnaco publicly announced 
its earnings for the third quarter of 2000. In the 
consolidated balance sheet attached to the press 
release, Warnaco reported that it had shareholders' 
equity of $348 million, cash of $227 million, and debt 
of $1.79 billion as of the end of the third quarter on 
September 30, 2000.  
Shortly after the press release was issued, 
Warnaco's lenders contacted Warnaco to inquire whether 
the company was in compliance with the financial 
covenants in its license agreement with Calvin Klein, 
Inc. The financial covenants in that license required 
Warnaco to maintain a debt-to-equity ratio of less 
than 5-to-1. The debt and equity amounts reported in 
79
the earnings release, however, revealed that Warnaco's 
debt-to-equity ratio had risen above 5-to-1. Under the 
terms of the licensing agreement, a violation of the 
covenant could result in termination of the license, 
which accounted for more than twenty-five percent of 
Warnaco's gross revenues.  
After Warnaco's then-CFO confirmed that the 
lenders' calculations were correct, the CFO decided to 
retroactively offset the company's cash on hand as of 
September 30 against its debt, which would reduce 
Warnaco's debt on paper and create the appearance that 
Warnaco had remained in compliance with the debt-to-
equity covenant as of the end of the quarter. The CFO 
asked Silverstein to send a letter to the auditors 
confirming that Warnaco and its lenders had entered 
into a legally enforceable agreement as of September 
29, 2000 that Warnaco's cash on hand would be offset 
against its debt. Silverstein sent the letter without 
ascertaining whether a legally enforceable agreement 
had been reached by that date. No legally enforceable 
agreement existed as of September 30.  
On November 12, 2000, Warnaco filed its quarterly 
report on Form 10-Q for the third quarter of fiscal 
2000. At the CFO's direction, the company used the 
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revised debt and cash amounts to prepare the 
consolidated balance sheet for the report. Using the 
revised amounts, Warnaco's debt-to-equity ratio was 
slightly less than 5-to-1, thereby creating the 
appearance that the company remained in compliance 
with the Calvin Klein licensing agreement. The 
quarterly report did not disclose that the cash and 
long-term debt amounts it reported differed from the 
amounts Warnaco had previously announced in its 
earnings release on November 2, 2000. Nor did the 
report disclose that Warnaco had offset $190.5 million 
in cash against long-term debt in order to reach the 
reported cash and debt amounts. As General Counsel of 
the company, Silverstein reviewed and signed Warnaco's 
Form 10-Q.  
The revised cash and debt amounts that Warnaco 
reported in its Form 10-Q were not calculated in 
conformity with GAAP. Under Financial Accounting 
Standards Board ("FASB") Interpretation No. 39 ("FIN 
39"), accounts can be offset only in certain limited 
instances:  
[T]he offset of assets and liabilities 
in the balance sheet is improper except 
where a right of setoff exists. . . . A 
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right of setoff exists when all of the 
following conditions are met: (a) Each of 
two parties owes the other determinable 
amounts; (b) The reporting party has the 
right to set off the amount owed with the 
amount owed by the other party; (c) The 
reporting party intends to set off; and 
(d) The right of setoff is enforceable at 
law.
FIN 39 also states that cash cannot be treated as 
an amount owed to the depositor by the financial 
institution and cannot be subject to set-off.  
None of the FIN 39 requirements were met. FIN 39 
specifically prohibits the set off of cash held on 
deposit at a financial institution, and therefore 
Warnaco could not treat its cash deposits as a "debt" 
owed to it by the banks. Moreover, there was no 
legally enforceable agreement between the company and 
its banks to repay the $190.5 million that was setoff. 
Finally, Warnaco never repaid $190.5 million, 
indicating that there was no agreement to offset that 
amount. Therefore, under GAAP, Warnaco was not 
permitted to offset the $190.5 million against debt. 
As a result, the quarterly report was misleading.  
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D. Violations...  
By filing a fiscal 1998 Form 10-K annual report 
on April 2, 1999 that misleadingly and inaccurately 
described the reason for the restatement of the 
company's financial statements, Warnaco violated 
Section 13(a) of the Exchange Act and Rules 12b-20 and 
13a-1 thereunder. Silverstein willfully aided and 
abetted and caused Warnaco's violation of Section 
13(a) and Rules 12b-20 and 13a-1 by approving the 
annual report that he knew or should have known 
contained a materially inaccurate and misleading 
description of the reasons for the company's 
restatement and the cause of the inventory 
overstatement.  
By filing a third quarter 2000 Form 10-Q 
quarterly report on November 12, 2000 that improperly 
offset $190.5 million in cash against long-term debt, 
Warnaco violated Section 13(a) of the Exchange Act and 
Rules 12b-20 and 13a-13 thereunder. Silverstein 
willfully aided and abetted and caused Warnaco's 
violation of Section 13(a) and Rules 12b-20 and 13a-13 
thereunder by approving and signing a quarterly report 
that he knew or should have known did not accurately 
represent Warnaco's debt and cash.  
83
E. Findings  
Based on the foregoing, the Commission finds that 
Silverstein willfully aided and abetted and caused 
Warnaco's violations of Section 13(a) of the Exchange 
Act and Rules 12b-20, 13a-1 and 13a-13 promulgated 
thereunder.  
F. Undertakings  
Silverstein undertakes and agrees that, for a 
period of two years from the date of the issuance of 
the Order:  
1. He will not sign any documents to be 
filed with the Commission, except for those 
filings made in his individual capacity that 
relate to his personal stock holdings; and  
2. He will not participate in or be 
responsible for the preparation or review of 
any documents to be filed with the 
Commission, except for those filings made in 
his individual capacity that relate to his 
personal stock holdings. Although he may 
provide information to others, upon request, 
for inclusion into documents to be filed 
with the Commission by or on behalf of 
Warnaco or another public company, he must 
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provide a copy of any such information to 
the Audit Committee of the Board of 
Directors of such company....  
ACCORDINGLY, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, effective 
immediately,  
A. Pursuant to Section 21C of the Exchange Act, 
Silverstein cease and desist from causing any 
violations and any future violations of Section 13(a) 
of the Exchange Act, and Rules 12b-20, 13a-1, and 13a-
13 promulgated thereunder.  
B. Pursuant to Rule 102(e)(1)(iii) of the 
Commission's Rules of Practice, Silverstein is hereby 
censured.  
C. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Silverstein shall, 
within ten days of the entry of this Order, pay 
disgorgement and prejudgment interest in the total 
amount of $165,772 to the United States Treasury.41 
There are a number of observations to be made with 
respect to the SEC’s findings in Silverstein.
First, the SEC’s findings have, at best, a very tenuous 
connection to legal advice. The main thrust of the SEC’s action 
is focused upon two accounting issues; and the SEC’s findings as 
 
41 In the Matter of Stanley P. Silverstein, Securities Exchange Act 
Release 49676 (May 11, 2004) 
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to Silverstein are either that he knew, or should have known, of 
certain reporting violations with respect to these accounting 
issues. 
Second, when the SEC’s Director of Enforcement, Stephen 
Cutler, discussed the Silverstein case in a contemporaneous 
speech, Mr. Cutler described the respondent as having “recently 
settled our charges against him for certifying a misleading 
annual report containing material misstatements that were at the 
heart of the company’s reporting violations.” (Emphasis Added) 
As one can see from the words of the SEC’s findings, however, 
there is no mention of the word “certifying” with respect to Mr. 
Silverstein. One wonders if Mr. Cutler was diverted by issues of 
improper accounting into a Freudian slip with respect to a 
lawyer’s responsibility for problems essentially beyond his 
legal domain. 
Third, in our opinion this is a case that probably would 
not have been brought against counsel individually in the pre-
Sarbanes-Oxley era. The SEC’s findings appear one-sided and too 
replete with “should have knowns” with respect to Mr. 
Silverstein. After studying the SEC’s opinion, one would very 
much like to hear Mr. Silverstein’s side of the story.  
For an action by the SEC against a lawyer, however, that 
would have been brought in the pre Sarbanes-Oxley era see In the 
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Matter of Robert J. Cassandro.42 The SEC’s colorful court 
complaint described the allegations. 
NATURE OF THIS ACTION 
1. This case arises out of a fraudulent scheme to 
manipulate the price of the stock of a publicly traded 
company, Spectrum Brands Corp. (“Spectrum Brands”), by 
exploiting the fear of bio-terrorism following 
September 11, 2001. A centerpiece of this scheme was 
the claim that a product sold by Spectrum Brands could 
“wipe out surface germs in less than 5 seconds, 
including anthrax.” In press releases, e-mails, faxes, 
and other communications to potential investors in 
late 2001, the stock promoters controlling Spectrum 
Brands issued false and misleading statements touting 
the company’s success in the war on “bioterrorism” and 
made unfounded predictions of dramatic increases in 
the stock price.  
2. Throughout the relevant period, Spectrum 
Brands was secretly managed and controlled by a group 
of stock promoters in Hicksville, New York, led by 
Saverio Galasso III (“the Hicksville promoters”), some 
of whom were convicted felons. To conceal its true 
ownership from the investing public, on or about 
 
42 Securities Exchange Act Release No. 50938 (Dec. 28, 2004). 
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October 31, 2001, Spectrum Brands stated in a document 
filed with the SEC (Form 8-K) that a Michael J. Burns 
was the sole officer and director of the company and 
that the corporate address was in Hauppauge, New York. 
In truth, Burns had little or no management 
responsibility for Spectrum Brands and the Hauppauge 
address was a mail drop. Spectrum Brands was actually 
controlled and managed by the Hicksville promoters.  
3. Defendant Robert J. Cassandro participated in 
drafting the false and misleading statements in the 
Form 8-K while knowing that the statements were false 
and misleading. Defendants Michael Cardascia and 
Stephen E. Apolant helped promote the Spectrum Brands 
stock via internet, radio, bulk e-mail, and fax while 
knowing that these communications contained false and 
misleading statements regarding the identity of the 
persons controlling and managing Spectrum Brands.... 
B. The Stock Manipulation 
15. By the end of October 2001 Galasso had 
obtained distribution rights to a hand-held ultra-
violet lighting device known as the “DeGERMinator.” On 
or about November 5, 2001, Spectrum Brands stated on 
its website that the “DeGERMinator” was capable of 
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“wip[ing] out surface germs in less than 5 seconds, 
including anthrax.”  
16. Spectrum Brands used its website, press 
releases, faxes, and e-mails to tout its alleged 
success in combating “bio-terrorism” and “cyber-
terrorism,” and to predict dramatic increases in the 
stock price. These promotional materials falsely 
indicated that Burns was in charge of the company and 
did not disclose that Spectrum Brands was controlled 
by Galasso.  
17. The price of Spectrum Brand’s stock rose from 
approximately $4 per share on November 1, 2001, to 
$11.75 on November 5, with an intra-day high of $14 on 
November 5.  
18. As of December 11, 2001, Galasso had placed 
approximately one million shares of Spectrum Brands 
stock in an offshore account he controlled. However, 
before Galasso was able to dump this stock on 
unsuspecting investors, Galasso, Hutter, and Dilluvio 
were arrested on criminal fraud charges.... 
D. Cassandro’s Role In The Fraud 
22. In late 2001 Cassandro served as an attorney 
for Spectrum Brands and knew that Galasso controlled 
the company. Indeed, Cassandro helped Galasso acquire 
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the preexisting corporate shell and install Burns as 
nominal president. Cassandro also helped Galasso 
obtain the distribution rights to the DeGERMinator and 
incorporate a wholly-owned subsidiary to market the 
DeGERMinator.  
 23. In October 2001 Cassandro helped prepare a 
Form 8-K on behalf of Spectrum Brands. On or about 
October 27, 2001, a former owner of the Spectrum 
Brands shell e-mailed Cassandro a draft Form 8-K. The 
draft stated that Burns was the “sole director” of the 
company. Spectrum Brands’ corporate address was not 
identified.  
24. On October 30, 2001, Dilluvio [one of the 
Hicksville promoters] e-mailed Cassandro a revised 
draft of the Form 8-K. The revised draft stated that 
Burns was the sole officer and director of the 
company, and that the corporate address was in 
Hauppauge.  
25. Cassandro then reviewed and revised the 
portions of the draft Form 8-K relating to corporate 
management, inserting language identifying specific 
corporate actions that allegedly left “Mr. Burns as 
the Sole Officer and Director.” Cassandro made no 
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change to the provisions identifying Hauppauge as the 
corporate address.  
26. Cassandro knew when he reviewed and revised 
the draft Form 8-K that Spectrum Brands was controlled 
by Galasso, not by Burns, and that the Hauppauge 
address was a sham. Cassandro also knew that Galasso 
was a convicted felon.  
27. Cassandro received 25,000 shares of Spectrum 
Brands stock as compensation for his work for Spectrum 
Brands. He subsequently sold 500 shares for $1.90 per 
share.43 
On December 10, 2004, the court entered an order 
permanently enjoining Cassandro, by consent, from future 
violations of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 
thereunder. Cassandro was ordered to pay $950 in disgorgement, 
plus $142 in prejudgment interest, and a $25,000 civil money 
penalty. Cassandro was also suspended from appearing or 
practising before the SEC as an attorney.  
For an SEC action against lawyers for preparing Forms 10, 
10-K, 10-Q and 13D that they allegedly knew, or recklessly 
disregarded, contained material misrepresentations and omitted 
material facts see SEC v. Syndicated Food Service International, 
 
43 SEC v. Cassandro, et al, 04 Civ. No. 4199 (E.D.N.Y., Dec. 10, 2004) 
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Inc. et al.44 The SEC's complaint contains very little specific 
detail with respect to the allegations against the lawyers.  
VII. SEC ACTIONS AGAINST LAWYERS – LAWYERS ISSUING IMPROPER 
LEGAL OPINIONS
In his speech at the UCLA Law School on September 20, 2004, 
which addressed lawyers’ responsibilities after the enactment of 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Stephen M. Cutler, the then Director of 
the SEC’s Division of Enforcement, focused specifically upon SEC 
actions against lawyers for issuing improper legal opinions.
Last April, for example, we brought an action against 
counsel to a Pennsylvania school district based on two 
unqualified legal opinions he issued regarding a note 
offering. [In the Matter of Ira Weiss and L. Andrew 
Shupe II, SEC Admin. Proc. No. 3-11462 (Feb. 25, 
2005)]. More recently, we sued another bond counsel 
who, we allege, issued favorable legal opinions on a 
series of municipal bond underwritings, despite his 
knowledge that the bond proceeds were being wrongfully 
commingled and diverted. [SEC v. Kasirer, et al. 04 
Civ. No. 4340 (N.D.Ill.), Jul. 1, 2004.]45
The first action noted by Mr. Cutler resulted in a clear 
defeat for the government at the hands of one of the SEC’s own 
administrative law judges. Since these “in-house” judges are not 
particularly noted for their impartiality in deciding Commission 
44 04 Civ. 1303 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2004). 
45 Speech by Stephen M. Cutler, The Themes of Sarbanes-Oxley as 
Reflected in the Commission’s Enforcement Program, UCLA School of Law, 
Los Angeles, CA, (Sep. 20, 2004). 
92
enforcement actions, the SEC prosecutors’ defeat and the forceful 
opinion articulating the reasons for that defeat are particularly 
noteworthy and particularly stinging. The following quotation 
from Weiss gives the flavor of the ALJ’s strong rejection of the 
SEC’s position in the case.
The Order Instituting Proceedings (OIP) alleges that 
in June 2000 the [Pennsylvania] School District 
fraudulently offered and sold $9,600,000 of General 
Obligation Notes, Series 2000, dated May 15, 2000 and 
maturing May 15, 2003 (Notes or Note Transaction). The 
OIP alleges that the Notes were offered and sold to 
investors based on a legal opinion, issued knowingly 
or recklessly by [lawyer Ira] Weiss, to the effect 
that the interest thereon would be exempt from federal 
taxation, and on a representation that the note 
proceeds would be used to fund the School District’s 
capital improvement projects. The OIP alleges that 
both of these statements were materially false and 
misleading and, additionally, that at the closing for 
the Notes Weiss knowingly or recklessly rendered 
another opinion to the effect that nothing had come to 
his attention that led him to believe that the 
Official Statement was materially inaccurate or 
incomplete.  
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The tax-exempt status of the Notes was dependent upon, 
among other matters, the School District reasonably 
expecting, on an objective basis, to spend 
substantially all of the proceeds of the Notes on 
capital projects within three years of the Notes’ 
issuance. The OIP alleges that the School District 
explicitly advised Weiss that it had not made any 
final decisions on its primary capital projects and 
that it did not want to be locked into undertaking the 
controversial project of renovating or adding to an 
existing school building by virtue of the financing. 
The OIP charges that Weiss, nevertheless, reassured 
the School Board members that as long as they 
“intended” to undertake the aforementioned project, 
the School District was not actually required to spend 
the money or to do the project in order to keep the 
arbitrage profit.  
The OIP further charges that thereafter, a School 
District official executed an inaccurate certificate, 
prepared by Weiss, that concerned the School 
District’s plans to expend proceeds of the Notes 
during the three-year period on capital projects. The 
OIP alleges that, at all relevant times, the School 
District intended to use the Note proceeds solely to 
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obtain $225,000 of interest rate arbitrage profit, 
which created significant risk that the interest from 
the Notes would not be exempt from federal income tax.  
As a result of the conduct described above, the OIP 
alleges that Weiss: (1) violated Section 17(a) of the 
Securities Act and Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act 
and Rule l0b-5 thereunder, and; (2) caused the School 
District to violate Section 17(a) of the Securities 
Act and Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 
l0b-5 thereunder.  
If I conclude that the allegations in the OIP are 
true, I must then determine whether: (1) pursuant to 
Section 8A of the Securities Act and Section 21C of 
the Exchange Act, Weiss should be ordered to cease and 
desist from committing or causing violations of and 
any future violations of Section 17(a) of the 
Securities Act and Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act 
and Rule l0b-5 thereunder, and; (2) pursuant to 
Section 8A of the Securities Act and Section 21C of 
the Exchange Act, an order requiring disgorgement, 
including reasonable interest, should be entered 
against Weiss.... 
Municipalities are prevented by law from garnering 
arbitrage profit by issuing municipal bonds, and using 
95
the proceeds solely for investing tax free in Federal 
Government bonds at a higher interest rate. The 
principal role of bond counsel in a municipal bond 
transaction is to give a legal opinion as to the 
validity of the bonds, and as to federal income tax 
exemption status of the interest paid on the bonds. 
Bond counsel’s role evolved in the nineteenth century 
after municipalities defaulted on bonds, due to state 
constitutional debt limits, and other factors that 
were ignored by the issuer. Purchasers of the bonds 
began to insist that a lawyer with recognized 
expertise in the area give an opinion as to the 
validity of the offering. Bond lawyers, such as Weiss, 
are listed in the Red Book, a national publication of 
the trade publishers of the Bond Guide. Division 
Exhibits 5 and 6 are the Model Opinion Report 
standards for bond lawyer practice in 1993 and 1997. 
If bond counsel concluded that it would be 
unreasonable for a court to rule against the bond 
counsel’s opinion on tax matters, an unqualified 
opinion could be given as to a municipal bond issue. 
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has established a 
three-prong test for determining whether a bond 
complies with the arbitrage restriction rules that 
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apply to municipalities. First, the expenditure test 
requires that eighty-five percent of the proceeds must 
be spent on capital projects within three years. 
Second, the time test requires that, within six months 
of issuance, the issuer must enter a substantial 
binding obligation to an outside party to expend at 
least five percent of the bond proceeds. And third, 
the due diligence test requires that the bond proceeds 
be used for completion of capital projects with due 
diligence. If the IRS concludes that any one prong of 
the test is not met, then the bonds will be classified 
as arbitrage bonds, and subject to federal income 
taxation.... 
After graduating from Duquesne University School of 
Law in 1973, Weiss clerked in Pennsylvania for an 
attorney who specialized in municipal and school law. 
In 1979, he opened his own practice in the same field. 
By the date of the hearing, Weiss had served as 
solicitor for more than a dozen school districts and 
municipalities, and as general counsel or special 
counsel for many others. Weiss has also served as a 
board member and chairman of the Allegheny County 
Sanitary Authority. Weiss’s experience with municipal 
bonds and notes stems from his work as solicitor, bond 
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counsel, issuer, or underwriter’s counsel during his 
legal career. Weiss appeared in the Red Book in 1986, 
and has participated in about 100 bond transactions as 
note or bond counsel. In 1999, Weiss had represented 
the School District in the trial and successful appeal 
of a state tax matter. During the relevant time 
period, seven of nine members of the Board had also 
been active in the tax case. Weiss attended several 
Board meetings during which he was questioned as to 
tax matters.  
Weiss was retained by the School District for the 
transaction at issue. Weiss knows that bond counsel is 
retained in a municipal bond transaction “to assure 
that the bonds are validly issued and to provide an 
opinion to that effect, as well as to the effect that 
they are issued on a tax-exempt basis....” Opinions of 
bond counsel are required so that purchasers can be 
assured that the interest on the bonds are “exempt 
from federal taxes.” Before issuing his opinion, Weiss 
ensures that the transaction meets all tax 
requirements. Weiss considered the defined project in 
the instant case to be capital repairs, renovations, 
and an addition to the elementary school. Mento 
[School District Superintendent], whom Weiss had known 
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since 1994, was Weiss’s primary contact with the 
School District.... 
Weiss told Solicitor Flannery [School Board’s Counsel] 
“that during the three-year period, provided the 
District was doing the projects, they could invest the 
money they weren’t using and gain positive interest.” 
In his conversation with Weiss, Weiss made it clear to 
Solicitor Flannery that “there had to be projects 
intended....” Weiss stated that the bond proceeds 
“could have been spent any time during the three 
years, as long as it was spent on the projects.” Weiss 
also made it clear to Solicitor Flannery that “until 
the [School] District proceeded with the projects, 
that they could legitimately earn interest on 
investments....”  
Weiss did not tell Solicitor Flannery that the School 
District had to spend five percent of the notes within 
six months, but Weiss did not consider it to be an 
“issue,” since the Board was “moving forward.” Weiss 
concluded from conversations with Solicitor Flannery 
and Mento that Eckles [architect] had an oral contract 
or commitment to perform work related to the listed 
projects. In Pennsylvania, the architect receives the 
majority of his fee before the project is advertised 
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for a bid. That fee is usually six or seven percent of 
construction costs. From Mento, Solicitor Flannery, 
and the Board, Weiss concluded that an architect was 
on “board.” Weiss knew that the Board was committed to 
“doing the elementary school,” which had electrical 
wiring problems. The Notes were structured on a three-
year basis with a one-year call. Ultimately, the Board 
called the Notes at the end of the year.  
During a May 8, 2000, Board meeting (May 8 Meeting), 
Shupe [investment banker] presented his note proposal. 
Shupe told the Board about a “loophole” in the tax 
laws that would allow school districts to borrow tax-
free money “as long as we had a pending building 
project.” This “loophole” would allow the School 
District to earn $225,000. During the presentation 
Shupe told the Board that they could borrow money just 
to invest the proceeds for profit. Weiss knew Shupe 
was wrong, and contradicted him. Weiss informed the 
Board that what Shupe described “[was not] exactly the 
case.” Weiss told the Board “that they had to have 
projects, that they had to spend the money in three 
years and they had to proceed with [the projects]” and 
that “if they didn’t want to do the project, [he] 
shouldn’t be there.”  
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President Flannery recalled that Weiss told the Board 
at the meeting that eighty-five percent of the 
proceeds of the Notes had to be spent on projects or 
contracted for before the end of the three years. I 
credit President Flannery’s testimony.... 
Weiss gave the Non-Arbitrage Certificate to Solicitor 
Flannery for his review eight days before the closing 
date, and Weiss relied upon it for the issuance of his 
opinion. The description of the capital projects in 
the Non-Arbitrage Certificate is consistent with the 
plans described by the Board, Mento, Solicitor 
Flannery, and other project language in similar 
certificates that Weiss had seen and generated in his 
legal career. Weiss is familiar with the U.S. Treasury 
Regulations relevant to this transaction and concluded 
that the Non-Arbitrage Certificate in the instant case 
met the Regulations. Weiss prepared the standard 
solicitor’s opinion for the signature of Solicitor 
Flannery. He also issued his unqualified Bond Opinion 
as to tax-exempt status of the Notes. “The purpose of 
the Notes was to fund capital improvement projects.” 
However, no proceeds from the sale of the Notes were 
used to provide funds for the capital improvements of 
the School District. Weiss received a fee of $9,000, 
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plus costs of $509.63 for his work in the instant 
case. The Notes were issued at closing on June 28, 
2000.... 
The Division [of Enforcement] alleges that Weiss 
violated the antifraud provisions by making several 
material misrepresentations and omissions during the 
course of his representation in the Note Transaction. 
The Division alleges that Weiss knew, or was reckless, 
in not knowing that the Notes were issued solely to 
gain illegal arbitrage profit when he: reviewed the 
preliminary official statement and Official Statement 
which represented that the issuance of the Notes was 
to provide funds for capital improvements; issued his 
unqualified Bond Opinion that the Notes would be 
exempt from federal income taxation; and, issued his 
Supplemental Opinion to the effect that nothing had 
come to his attention that led him to believe that the 
Official Statement was materially inaccurate or 
incomplete. Specifically, the Division alleges that 
the representations communicated to noteholders in the 
Bond Opinion, the Supplemental Opinion, and the 
Official Statement, are the basis for Weiss’s direct 
violations of the securities laws. The Division argues 
that the misrepresentations and omissions made to the 
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School District serve as evidence of scienter.  
The Division alleges that Weiss either knew the School 
District issued Notes for the sole purpose of 
obtaining arbitrage profit, or was reckless or 
negligent in not knowing, because he failed to follow 
industry standards. The Division alleges that the 
following facts are evidence of Weiss’s knowing or 
reckless misconduct: the May 2 Letter from Weiss to 
the Solicitor Flannery, in which Weiss misstated both 
his experience and the law (specifically, 26 C.F.R. 
§1.148-2(e)); the May 8 Meeting and Weiss’s 
reactions/communications in which he failed to advise 
the School Board that the transaction was illegal 
(pursuant to 26 C.F.R. §1.148-2(e)); Solicitor 
Flannery raised concerns with Weiss and pointed out 
that the School District had not decided what projects 
they were going to undertake; Board members asked 
Weiss “pointed questions,” including what happens if 
the School District does not spend the money; Shupe 
presented Weiss with a document prior to the Note 
issue showing Shupe’s intention to tie the money up 
for three years in an illiquid investment; Weiss 
failed to obtain cost estimates from the School 
District for the projects, despite a Treasury 
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Regulation that requires estimates as a part of the 
process; and, when the IRS began its investigation, 
Weiss assisted the School District in redeeming the 
Notes, rather than advising the School District to 
quickly enter into binding commitments as there was 
still time to meet the Treasury Regulation 
requirements. The Division, additionally, alleges that 
Weiss failed to investigate whether the School 
District took any of the required steps required by 
Pennsylvania law to undertake construction projects.  
The Division’s position fails to take into account the 
unique events that affected the Board’s decisions. It 
also mischaracterizes the relationship between Weiss 
and the Board members. Weiss acted with the requisite 
standard of care. Weiss contacted Mento, who informed 
him that the School District was committed to 
renovations and other repairs, and that there was an 
architect on board. When he met with Mento, he advised 
Mento of the pertinent Treasury Regulations, and was 
informed that the School District was “committed” to 
renovations. During the May 8 Meeting, Weiss 
contradicted Shupe, after Shupe told the Board that 
they could borrow money in advance of construction 
projects and legally keep the investment earnings. At 
104
the May 8 Meeting, he advised the School Board that 
this was not the case. While he never received the 
estimates for the projects that he requested from 
Mento, Weiss reasonably believed he could issue his 
opinion based on his conversation with School 
Officials and his own experience. Weiss also attended 
two Board meetings and forwarded the closing documents 
to Solicitor Flannery eight days before closing. I 
conclude that Weiss’s actions were consistent with the 
actions of a reasonable bond counsel. This conclusion 
is based on the expert opinions of Weiss’s witnesses, 
Henry Klaiman and Wayne Gerhold.  
I conclude that the School District did not issue the 
Notes solely for the purpose of obtaining arbitrage 
profit. I also conclude that Weiss did not act 
recklessly, or negligently, during the course of his 
representation of the School District for the Note 
Transaction. I reject the opinions of the Division’s 
expert witnesses, Joseph H. Johnson and Charles 
Anderson. The securities laws generally define 
recklessness as an act so highly unreasonable and such 
an extreme departure from the standard of ordinary 
care to the extent that the “danger” was either known 
or so obvious that the accused must have been aware of 
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it. See Phillips v. LCI Int’l, Inc., 190 F.3d 609, 621 
(4th Cir. 1999). The parties are in agreement that at 
the time of the Note issuance the prevailing standard 
of practice for counsel issuing a tax opinion was set 
forth in the National Association of Bond Lawyer’s 
(NABL) Model Bond Opinion Report for 1997, which 
states:  
Bond counsel should not render an 
unqualified opinion as to the validity and 
tax exemption of bonds unless it has 
concluded that it would be unreasonable for 
a Court to hold to the contrary. Bond 
counsel may reach such a conclusion as to 
federal income tax issues addressed in the 
opinion by determining that there is no 
reasonable possibility that the [IRS] would 
not concur or acquiesce in the opinion if it 
considered all material legal issues and 
relevant facts.  
The plain language of the NABL Model Bond Opinion 
Report for 1997 is clear: a bond counsel’s opinion 
must be reasonable, and, in reference to tax matters, 
there must be no reasonable possibility that, if it 
considered all material legal issues and relevant 
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facts, the IRS would not concur. Taking the material 
legal issues and relevant facts into account, it would 
be an impermissible extension of the legal 
responsibility of bond counsel to conclude that Weiss 
violated the antifraud provisions of the securities 
laws.... 
I conclude that Weiss’s failure to include cost 
estimates does not make him reckless or negligent. 
With his vast experience in municipal and school law, 
and with the material facts and circumstances known to 
him at the time, it was reasonable for Weiss to issue 
his opinion without cost estimates in the closing 
documents. He knew that the projects would cost $10 
million to complete and he knew that the projects had 
been planned for years and were overdue. Weiss 
completed the Non-Arbitrage Certificate, and gave it 
to Solicitor Flannery for review eight days before the 
transaction closed on June 28, 2000. The Non-Arbitrage 
Certificate stated that the purpose of the Notes was 
to fund “capital projects in the [School] District,” 
and also set out the expenditure, time, and due 
diligence tests in Treasury Regulation §1.148-2. 
Weiss’s representation of the School District ended 
when the transaction closed. At no time before the 
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Notes closed on June 28, 2000, did anyone associated 
with the School District indicate that they planned to 
abandon the projects in order to enrich the School 
District’s coffers with arbitrage profits. To the 
contrary, it is clear that at the time of the closing 
for the Notes, the School District reasonably expected 
to proceed with the projects. There were newspaper 
articles about the School Districts engaging in 
capital projects and Mento had been hired for the 
express purpose of leading the completion of the 
capital projects. The School District had also hired a 
municipal consultant to perform demographic work and, 
at the very least, consulted with an architect who 
provided cost estimates for several projects. The 
School District knew that renovations were long 
overdue and that the total cost would be over $10 
million.  
Thus, at the time the Notes were issued, the School 
District reasonably expected to satisfy Treasury 
Regulation §1.148-2. I credit the testimony of 
President Flannery who concluded that at the time of 
the May 8 Meeting, he and the entire Board had 
reasonable expectations that capital improvement 
projects would be completed with the proceeds from the 
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Notes. I therefore conclude that a prudent person in 
the same circumstances would have reached the same 
expectations and taken the same actions. The School 
District stated that it reasonably expected to satisfy 
the expenditure, time, and due diligence tests, but 
was “thrown into turmoil due to several highly 
contentious, controversial, and largely unforeseeable 
events” immediately after the issuance of the Notes. 
Although the School District ultimately settled with 
the IRS, the closing agreement between the School 
District and the IRS specifically states that the 
School District “contends that it issued the [Notes] 
with the reasonable expectations to use the bonds for 
governmental purposes.” The Division fails to take 
into account the Board’s reasonable explanation for 
its own conduct.  
In a case nearly on point, the United States District 
Court for the Western District of Oklahoma held that a 
bond counsel’s opinions regarding the tax-exempt 
status of bonds were violations of the issuer, not the 
issuer’s attorney, even if the bond opinions were 
wrong. SEC v. Haswell, 1977 WL 1074 (W.D. Okla. 1977), 
aff’d, 654 F.2d 698 (10th Cir. 1981). In Haswell, a 
bond attorney, in issuing his tax opinion, failed to 
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insist upon viewing the underwriter’s final form of 
the offering circular, which improperly omitted 
financial projections. Id. at *3-4. The Commission 
characterized this as a violation of the antifraud 
provisions of the federal securities laws, alleging 
that his bond opinions as to the tax-exempt status of 
the bonds were falsely issued. Id. While stating that 
“a more careful attorney would have insisted” upon 
reviewing the final offering circular, the court held 
that failure to do so did not necessitate a finding of 
fraudulent or reckless behavior. Id. In making its 
decision, the court found that the bond opinions were 
carefully considered and made in “utmost good faith.” 
Id. at 4.  
It would be an impermissible interpretation of the law 
to conclude that Weiss violated the antifraud 
provisions of the federal securities laws. The 
Division points out, correctly, that the bond opinions 
in Haswell were never challenged by any governmental 
agency charged with enforcement of the Internal 
Revenue Code, while the IRS has “determined” that the 
Notes in the case at hand were not tax-exempt. A 
settlement agreement, even one with the IRS, is not 
binding as to any legal issue in this case. In fact, 
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the closing agreement states that it is binding 
between the School District and IRS, and is limited 
specifically to those parties and to the issue of the 
tax-exempt status of the Notes. The facts show that 
Weiss followed the then-applicable standards when 
arriving at the conclusions in his bond opinions and 
that in doing so he acted in good faith. I therefore 
conclude that Weiss’s opinions were not fraudulently, 
recklessly, or negligently issued. To find otherwise 
would be to hold Weiss responsible for the inaction of 
the School District after the issuance of the 
Notes....  
The Division bases its Section 8A Securities Act claim 
and Section 21C Exchange Act claim on the same theory 
on which it based Weiss’s primary violations of the 
antifraud provision of the federal securities laws. 
That is: the School issued a false Official Statement 
and Weiss, in preparing the Non-Arbitrage Certificate, 
Bond Opinion, and Supplemental Opinion, caused the 
School District to violate the antifraud provisions of 
the federal securities laws. For the same reasons that 
Weiss did not violate Section 17(a) of the Securities 
Act and Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, and Rule 
l0b-5 thereunder, I conclude that Weiss did not cause 
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the School District to violate the antifraud provision 
of the federal securities laws....  
I conclude that the Division has failed to prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence that Weiss violated 
Section 17(a) of the Securities Act, or Section 10(b) 
of the Exchange Act and Rule l0b-5 thereunder. I 
further conclude that the Division has failed to carry 
the necessary burden and prove that, pursuant to 
Section 8A of the Securities Act and Section 21C of 
the Exchange Act, Weiss caused the School District to 
violate Section 17(a) of the Securities Act, or 
Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, and Rule l0b-5 
thereunder. Thus this matter must be dismissed....46 
The second SEC action against a lawyer for rendering an 
improper legal opinion noted by Mr. Cutler in the excerpt from 
his speech quoted above, SEC v. Kasirer, et al, resulted in the 
more common resolution of the lawyer consenting to the entry of a 
final judgment without admitting or denying the SEC’s 
allegations. The final judgment (1) permanently enjoined the 
lawyer, Joel T. Boehm from violating Section 17(a) of the 
Securities Act of 1933 and Section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 thereunder; and (2) ordered 
Boehm to pay disgorgement in the amount of $152,500, plus
46 In the Matter of Ira Weiss, and L. Andrew Shupe II, SEC Admin. Proc. 
No. 3-11462 (Feb. 25, 2005). 
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prejudgment interest in the amount of $62,902.64, did not impose 
a civil penalty and waived payment of all but $24,167.99 of the 
disgorgement and prejudgment interest ordered based on Boehm’s 
representations to the Commission regarding his financial 
condition. 
The factual allegations with respect to Boehm were detailed 
in the SEC’s complaint. 
1. From February 1996 through August 1999, the 
Defendants, acting in concert, fraudulently offered 
and sold over $131 million of municipal revenue bonds 
to members of the public. The Defendants offered and 
sold the bonds in question through a series of eleven 
offerings underwritten by the now-defunct, Minnesota 
firm of Miller & Schroeder Financial, Inc. (“Miller & 
Schroeder”). The Defendants sold the bonds to more 
than 1,800 investors residing in 36 States.  
2. The purported purpose of each bond offering 
was to finance the development of a specified 
healthcare facility by Heritage Housing Development, 
Inc., a company effectively controlled by Defendant 
Kasirer (“Heritage”). The Heritage facilities 
consisted of various senior assisted living facilities 
and a hospital. All together, there were ten Heritage 
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facilities located in the States of Texas, Florida, 
Illinois and California.  
3. The Defendants represented in offering 
documents that the proceeds from each bond offering 
would be used to finance one specific healthcare 
facility. In fact, however, from the very beginning 
the costs of developing the Heritage facilities, 
including payments to Defendant Kasirer and some of 
his family members, outstripped the proceeds from the 
facilities’ respective bond offerings.  
4. The Defendants covered the resulting cash 
shortfalls by operating a type of Ponzi scheme, 
commingling bond proceeds and diverting bond proceeds 
from more recent offerings to pay the expenses of 
earlier projects. Eventually all ten of the Heritage 
facilities failed.  
5. The diversion of bond proceeds from one 
project to another went on for three years. The 
Defendants did not mention their diversion of bond 
proceeds in any of the offering documents, and instead 
falsely represented that the bond proceeds from each 
offering would be used only for that respective 
Heritage facility. Miller & Schroeder continued to 
sell the Heritage bonds to investors until early 
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August 1999. The following month, September 1999, the 
Defendants’ commingling and diversion of bond proceeds 
was publicly disclosed. Beginning in February 2000, 
the Heritage facilities ran out of money and defaulted 
on their obligations to the bondholders. Presently, 
all the Heritage facilities are in default on their 
bonds. 
6. Defendants Kasirer and Goldstein, the primary 
architects of the scheme, controlled Heritage. 
Defendants Kasirer and Goldstein personally directed 
the commingling and misapplication of bond proceeds. 
Defendants Iverson and Dhooge, representatives of 
Miller & Schroeder, managed the underwriting of the 
various bond offerings, despite their knowledge that 
bond proceeds were being wrongfully commingled and 
diverted. Defendant Boehm, an attorney who acted as 
counsel for Miller & Schroeder in the bond offerings, 
issued favorable legal opinions despite his knowledge 
that bond proceeds were being wrongfully commingled 
and diverted. Defendants Kasirer, Goldstein, Boehm, 
Iverson and Dhooge, acting knowingly or with a 
reckless disregard for the truth, all took part in 
writing, reviewing, or disseminating bond prospectuses 
(“Official Statements”) which misled investors with 
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regard to, among other things, Defendant Kasirer’s 
role in the affairs of Heritage, the financial 
condition of the Heritage facilities, and the true 
uses to be made of the bond proceeds. All the 
Defendants personally profited from the scheme.  
7. Defendants Kasirer, Goldstein, Boehm, Iverson 
and Dhooge, directly and indirectly, have engaged in 
and, unless enjoined, will continue to engage in, 
acts, practices and courses of business which 
constitute and will constitute violations of Section 
17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, Section 10(b) of 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”) 
and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder.  
8. Plaintiff brings this action to enjoin such 
acts, practices and courses of business, and for other 
equitable relief, pursuant to Section 20(b) and 20(c) 
of the Securities Act and Sections 21(d) and 21(e) of 
the Exchange Act....  
16. At all times relevant to this Complaint, 
Defendant Boehm, who is 57 years old, lived in or near 
Carlsbad, California. Boehm, who is an attorney, 
served as counsel to the underwriter, Miller & 
Schroeder, for nine of the bond offerings at issue in 
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this suit and as bond counsel for one of the bond 
offerings at issue in this suit.... 
34. Defendant Boehm acted as the Underwriter’s 
Counsel for nine of the Heritage Bond offerings—those 
for the Danforth Gardens, Sam Houston, St. Joseph 
Gardens, House of  Sarasota, Duval Gardens, Eastwood 
Gardens, House of Seminole and Valley Gardens 
projects. Defendant Boehm also served as Bond Counsel 
for the second Heritage Hospital (“Rancho”) offering. 
As Underwriter’s Counsel, Defendant Boehm was 
responsible for preparing the Heritage bond Official 
Statements. Defendant Boehm also was responsible for 
performing due diligence regarding the Heritage bonds. 
As Bond Counsel, Boehm was responsible to ensure that 
the second Heritage Hospital offering was validly 
issued under state bond law. Defendant Boehm provided 
information for and reviewed each of these Heritage 
bond Official Statements before it was distributed to 
investors.... 
39. Defendant Kasirer’s family also benefited 
from the Heritage bond offerings. Defendant Kasirer’s 
wife, Debra Kasirer, was paid, under her maiden name, 
as an interior design consultant by one of the 
Heritage Affiliates, although she performed no work 
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for that Affiliate. Moreover, Golden State Health 
Centers, Inc., of which Kasirer’s father was the Vice 
President and Chief Operating Officer, was hired by a 
Heritage Affiliate to be the supervisory manager of 
the Sarasota project. Defendant Kasirer’s father was 
unaware of this arrangement.  
40. Defendant Kasirer also received money from 
the underwriter’s counsel, Defendant Boehm. On or 
around September 1998, Boehm wrote a check to 
Defendant Kasirer in the amount of $18,000 pursuant to 
an undisclosed agreement under which Defendant Boehm 
shared a portion of the underwriter’s counsel fees 
with Defendant Kasirer. Defendant Boehm’s payments to 
Defendant Kasirer purportedly were to compensate 
Defendant Kasirer for time spent by Defendant Kasirer 
and employees of Health Care Holdings in assisting in 
the preparation of the Official Statements. In effect, 
Defendant Kasirer was receiving a portion of the fees 
of the lawyer who was supposed to be conducing due 
diligence with respect to Defendant Kasirer. In 
addition, Defendant Boehm’s law firm, Atkinson, 
Andelson, Loya, Ruud and Romo, wire-transferred monies 
to Debra Kasirer on October 29, 1998 in the sum of 
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$24,000; on January 22, 1999 in the sum of $48,000 and 
on April 12, 1999 in the sum of $24,000.... 
49. As alleged above, each Heritage bond 
Official Statement stated that the proceeds from each 
offering would be disbursed to fund debt service and 
to pay certain specified expenses in connection with 
the facility for which each offering was being 
conducted.  
50. Nevertheless, although each Heritage Official  
Statement specified that the bond proceeds would only 
be used on the project identified in that Official 
Statement, Defendant Kasirer, through Rubin and other 
Heritage personnel, began commingling and diverting 
the bond proceeds among Heritage and the Heritage 
Affiliates shortly after the very first offering had 
been completed in 1996. The commingling and diversion 
of the proceeds from the Heritage bond offerings 
continued until at least August 1999.  
51. Defendants Goldstein, Boehm, Iverson, and 
Dhooge each learned of the commingling and diversion 
of bond proceeds at various times during 1997 and 
1998, as alleged below. Nevertheless, after learning 
of the misuse of bond proceeds, Defendants Goldstein, 
Boehm, Iverson, and Dhooge continued to participate in 
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the drafting and distribution of Official Statements 
and in the offer and sale of Heritage bonds, without 
disclosing the commingling and diversion of the bond 
proceeds. Indeed, after he became an officer of 
Heritage, Defendant Goldstein personally directed 
numerous wrongful disbursements of bond proceeds among 
Heritage and the Heritage Affiliates.... 
63. Defendants Kasirer, Goldstein, Boehm, 
Iverson and Dhooge knew or were reckless in not 
knowing that bond proceeds were being improperly 
commingled and diverted.  
64. On March 6, 1997, Bond Counsel for the Sam 
Houston project wrote to Defendant Boehm advising 
Defendant Boehm that he had learned of an agreement, 
under which a Heritage entity had incurred a liability 
in connection with the St. Joseph’s acquisition and 
that the Heritage entity intended to repay the 
liability when the Sam Houston bonds were issued. In 
Bond Counsel’s letter, which was addressed to 
Defendant Boehm and copied to Defendants Goldstein, 
Kasirer, and Dhooge, Bond Counsel stated:  
 [I was advised] that in connection with the 
St. Joseph’s acquisition, a Columbia entity 
loaned Heritage V $32,878.30 for which 
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Heritage V gave a promissory note (“the 
Heritage V. Note”). . . . Heritage V agreed 
to repay the Heritage V Note when the Sam 
Houston bonds are issued. . . . As we are 
sure you are aware, the Sam Houston bond 
proceeds may not be used to repay the 
Heritage V Note.  
Thus, as early as March 6, 1997 Defendants Boehm, 
Kasirer, Goldstein and Dhooge were advised that bond 
proceeds from one project could not be diverted to 
another project.  
65. In performing an audit of the 1996 financial 
statements of the Rancho project, Heritage’s 
independent auditors discovered that during 1996 
Heritage had disbursed bond proceeds for the Rancho 
project in ways that were inconsistent with the 
Official Statement for the Rancho offering. On May 30, 
1997, the Heritage auditors sent a letter to the Board 
of Directors of the Heritage Affiliate for the Rancho 
project. In this letter, the auditors stated: 
The funds received from the bond proceeds 
were not used according to the covenants and 
agreements i.e. the receivable from Heritage 
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Housing. If this is not corrected, the tax 
exempt status of bonds could be in jeopardy.  
The Board of Directors of the Heritage Affiliate for 
the Rancho project consisted of the Directors of 
Heritage.  
66. In March 1998, Heritage auditors spoke with  
Defendants Boehm and Dhooge and expressed concern 
about the transfers of bond proceeds among various 
Heritage projects. Defendant Boehm told the auditors 
that such “inter-company transfers” were not 
prohibited under the Heritage bond offering documents 
and that while such transfers were not preferred, they 
were common among non-profit entities and did not 
break any laws.  
67. On June 1, 1998, a meeting took place in 
Miller & Schroeder’s Solana Beach office. Defendants 
Kasirer, Goldstein, Boehm, Iverson, and Dhooge all 
attended the meeting. Defendants Goldstein and Kasirer 
informed those present of at least one instance of a 
misappropriation of investor funds and a wrongful 
transfer of these funds. At the meeting Defendant 
Dbooge instructed Defendants Kasirer and Goldstein 
that only surplus revenues, not bond proceeds, could 
be loaned from one project to another project. 
122
68. Defendants Iverson, Dhooge, and Boehm did not  
attempt to obtain more specific information from 
Defendants Goldstein and Kasirer at the meeting. 
Defendants Iverson, Dhooge, and Boehm also did nothing 
to notify the [Bond Indenture] Trustee or the 
investors of the misappropriation that had taken 
place. Nor did Defendants Iverson, Dhooge, and Boehm 
take any action to prevent the misappropriation of 
bond proceeds in the future. In fact, at or after the 
meeting, Defendant Iverson instructed Defendant Dhooge 
not to tell the Minneapolis office of Miller & 
Schroeder or the [Bond Indenture] Trustee about the 
misappropriation of investor funds.... 
74. Each Heritage bond Official Statement 
contained a section regarding “Estimated Sources and 
Uses of Funds.” In each Official Statement, the listed 
uses—purchase price of existing facility, renovation, 
architecture and engineering, costs of issuance—all 
related to costs of the facility for which the bonds 
were issued.  
75. Each Heritage bond Official Statement also 
contained a summary statement such as the following, 
from the Valley Gardens offering Official Statement; 
“The proceeds derived from the sale of the [Valley 
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Garden] Bonds will be used to repay certain debt 
obligations incurred in connection with the 
acquisition of the Existing Facility, perform the 
Renovation Project, fund a Debt Service Reserve Fund, 
initially fund the Valley Gardens Indigency Fund, fund 
start-up costs and capitalized interest and pay 
certain costs of issuance with respect to the [Valley 
Garden] Bonds.” In each offering, the stated uses for 
the bond proceeds relate only to the particular 
facility involved with that offering.  
76. None of the Heritage bond Official Statements 
discloses that a possible use of the bond proceeds 
might be a transfer of those proceeds to other, 
failing, Heritage projects.  
77. None of the Heritage bond Official Statements 
disclosed the extensive commingling of bond proceeds 
among the various Heritage projects, the financial 
interdependence of the Heritage projects, the 
contemplated use of bond proceeds to pay existing 
facilities expenses, or the construction delays, cost 
overruns and financial difficulties experienced at the 
other Heritage projects. The Heritage bond Official 
Statements did not disclose these material facts, even 
though Defendants Kasirer and Goldstein knew, and 
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Defendants Boehm, Iverson and Dhooge knew, or 
recklessly disregarded, the undisclosed facts.  
78. Four of the Heritage facilities, (Duval 
Gardens, Eastwood Gardens, House of Seminole, and 
Valley Gardens) were part of a master indenture 
financing structure. This master indenture financing 
structure was instituted at the request of Miller & 
Schroeder and allowed surplus revenues of the 
projects—not bond proceeds, but, rather operating 
revenues remaining after debts and other obligations 
had been met—to be utilized to obligors under the 
master indenture. The master indenture financing 
structure did not permit the transfer of bond proceeds 
from one project to another. 
79. Each of the Official Statements represented 
that Heritage and the Heritage affiliate involved in 
that offering were governed by an Independent Board of 
Directors which was responsible for overseeing and 
managing the affairs of Heritage and the Heritage 
affiliate. These representations were false and 
misleading. In fact Heritage and the Heritage 
affiliates involved in the offerings were effectively 
controlled by Defendant Kasirer.  
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80. Each of the Heritage bond Official Statements 
touted the experience and abilities of Defendant 
Kasirer. The Official Statements highlighted Kasirer’s 
experience in developing retirement communities, 
assisted living facilities and healthcare facilities 
for non-for-profit owners. However, the Official 
Statements failed to disclose Defendant Kasirer’s 
control of Heritage, his several prior business 
failures, and several judgments that had been entered 
against him. Defendants Goldstein and Boehm knew of 
Defendant Kasirer’s prior business failures; and 
Defendants Iverson and Dhooge knew or were reckless in 
not knowing of Kasirer’s prior business failures.  
81. The Heritage Official Statements fail to 
disclose the conflict of interest created by the fact 
that the underwriter’s counsel had entered into an 
agreement with Kasirer, wherein the underwriter’s 
counsel was giving a portion of his fees to Kasirer.47 
For another example of an SEC action against a lawyer for 
issuing an improper opinion see Section III above, SEC v. 
Universal Express, et al, 04 Civ. 02322 (S.D.N.Y., Mar. 24, 
2004) where the SEC alleged in Paragraph 25 of its complaint 
 
47 SEC v. Kasirer, et al, 04 Civ. No. 4340 (N.D.Ill., Jul. 1, 2004).  
See also SEC Litigation Release No. 19131 (Mar. 14, 2005). 
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that Universal’s counsel, Gunderson, had “prepared a legal 
opinion falsely stating that the shares were ‘covered by the 
company’s S-8 registrations for its common shares’.” 
VIII. SEC ACTIONS AGAINST LAWYERS – REFLECTIONS
As can be seen after reviewing the compendium of cases 
presented here, there are a number of areas in which the SEC has 
initiated actions against lawyers following the enactment of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act.  There are certain conclusions which may be 
drawn from the tenor, tone, and approach adopted by the SEC in 
these cases. 
First, as stated in Section I above, the sheer number of SEC 
actions against lawyers after the enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley has 
increased dramatically. It appears to the authors of this 
article, who have a combined experience of over 100 years 
practicing and teaching securities law, that the SEC has changed 
from a pre-Sarbanes orientation of presumptively not initiating 
actions against lawyers to a post-Sarbanes orientation of 
aggressively targeting lawyers for disciplinary action, often for 
not fulfilling some vague, SEC conceived role as “gatekeepers.”
Second, as can be seen in Sections I through VII above, the 
range and diversity of the legal theories employed by the SEC in 
actions against lawyers has expanded dramatically. The new 
spectrum of actions extends all the way from the traditionally 
serious offenses of furnishing false information to accountants, 
participating in preparing false SEC filings, and knowingly
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issuing improper opinions, to the relatively minor participation 
in filing an allegedly misleading Form 12b-25.48
Third, along with the dramatic expansion in the range and 
diversity of the legal theories employed by the SEC in actions 
against lawyers, there has been an increasing disparity between 
SEC actions against lawyers involving serious offenses on the one 
hand and SEC actions against lawyers sanctioning minor 
transgressions on the other hand. Thus in Section III above we 
have seen the contrast between Isselmann and Hill, in Section V
the gap between Google and Labertew, in Section VI the gulf 
between Silverstein and Cassandro, and in Section VII the 
disparity between Weiss and Boehm. And, as we have discussed, 
actions against lawyers is not an area where the SEC can achieve 
a just result by calibrating the punishment to fit the 
transgression. Any SEC action against a lawyer, no matter what 
the ultimate outcome, may destroy the lawyer’s ability to 
effectively practice his/her profession and/or engender
“collateral damage” of emotional devastation and financial ruin.
Fourth, while SEC personnel have voiced the importance of 
understanding the “tension” between the role of attorneys as 
gatekeepers/whistleblowers and the role of attorneys as zealous 
advocates/confidence keepers, there is scant evidence that the 
SEC enforcers much care about the advocacy side of the equation. 
A survey of the cases fails to reveal any express demonstration 
48 Form 12b-25 is not required to be distributed to the investing 
public. 
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of the SEC evaluating, interpreting, or considering the 
obligations of the attorneys involved to the clients represented.  
While the language of the actions focuses on the gatekeeper 
function, in not one of the cases reviewed can it be discerned 
whether the SEC made any attempt to evaluate the respective 
attorney’s obligation to “push the envelope” for the benefit of 
the client.    
The SEC’s enforcement division is, by the nature of its 
mission, analogous to a criminal prosecutor’s office.  While the 
SEC and criminal prosecutors are well-situated to address 
circumstances like egregious cases of document falsification and 
outright falsehoods, in those cases involving gray areas the 
filing of an SEC complaint with its severe collateral 
consequences may be too blunt an instrument to use in calculating
whether the lawyers involved properly balanced their advocacy and 
“gatekeeper” duties.
Finally, during the post-Sarbanes era, the SEC has initiated 
actions against lawyers for activities which would never have 
been sanctioned pre-Sarbanes. Isselmann discussed in Section III, 
Google and Milling examined in Section V, Silverstein addressed 
in Section VI, and Weiss in Section VII rejected by the SEC’s own 
Administrative Law Judge – all fit within this category.
Multiple commentators have taken on the challenge of 
interpreting and opining on the Sarbanes-Oxley provisions 
involving lawyers.  While these debates are useful and thought-
provoking, the real test must involve an ongoing review of the 
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actual cases brought, the issues raised, and the results reached.
Sarbanes-Oxley may be the SEC’s recipe, but the proof, as always, 
is in the pudding.
